企业的投资活动是企业财务管理的重要环节，投资效率的提升从长期来看对企业的稳步发展至关重要。近年来，通过股权质押这一方式来获取融资的控股股东数量逐年增多，且质押规模快速扩张，但随之带来的风险也引发国内外学者的广泛关注。股权质押后，控股股东面临着控制权转移风险，其行为模式的改变，可能会导致控股股东通过控制权和表决权干预企业投资活动，进而影响公司的投资效率。

       鉴于此，本文结合信息不对称理论、委托代理理论和“隧道挖掘”理论，分析控股股东股权质押对企业投资效率的影响机理。在此基础上以2015-2019年我国A股上市公司为研究样本，运用多元回归模型进行实证研究，分析控股股东股权质押对投资效率的影响，并探究产权性质、机构投资者持股比例及其异质性对二者之间关系的影响差异。

       研究结果表明：（1）控股股东股权质押对企业投资效率存在负向影响，并且会导致上市公司投资过度和投资不足。（2）机构投资者持股对控股股东股权质押与投资效率之间的关系具有负向调节作用，且机构投资者持股比例越高，其负向调节作用越强。（3）在探究机构投资者异质性调节作用的过程中发现，压力抵抗型机构投资者对控股股东股权质押与投资效率之间的关系具有负向调节作用；而压力敏感型机构投资者在二者间的负向调节作用不显著。（4）在非国有企业中控股股东股权质押对企业投资效率的负向影响更为显著，而在国有企业中不显著。

       最后，本文根据以上结论提出：（1）监管部门应制定和完善股权质押信息披露制度，对质押目的、资金用途等信息披露作出要求，规范股东股权质押行为。（2）上市公司应完善公司内部治理机制，优化自身股权结构。（3）应大力发展机构投资者，合理优化各类机构投资者的比例，完善外部治理机制，促进企业可持续发展。

        The investment activity of an enterprise is an important part of the financial management of an enterprise. The improvement of investment efficiency is crucial to the steady development of an enterprise in the long run. In recent years, the number of controlling shareholders who obtain financing through equity pledge has increased year by year, and the scale of pledge has expanded rapidly. However, the risks brought by the pledge have also attracted extensive attention from scholars at home and abroad. After equity pledge, the controlling shareholder is faced with the risk of control transfer, and the change of its behavior pattern may lead to the controlling shareholder to interfere with the investment activities of the company through the control right and voting right, thus affecting the investment efficiency of the company.

       In view of this, this paper combines information asymmetry theory, principal-agent theory and "tunneling" theory to analyze the influence mechanism of controlling shareholders' equity pledge on enterprise investment efficiency. On this basis, taking China's A-share listed companies from 2015 to 2019 as research samples, this paper uses multiple regression model to conduct empirical research, analyzes the impact of controlling shareholders' equity pledge on investment efficiency, and explores the impact of property right nature, institutional investors' shareholding ratio and its heterogeneity on the relationship between the two.

        The results show that :(1) The equity pledge of controlling shareholders has a negative impact on the investment efficiency of enterprises, and will lead to over-investment and under-investment of listed companies. (2) The shareholding of institutional investors has a negative moderating effect on the relationship between the equity pledge of controlling shareholders and investment efficiency, and the higher the shareholding ratio of institutional investors is, the stronger the negative moderating effect will be. (3) In the process of exploring the regulatory effect of institutional investors' heterogeneity, it is found that the stress-resistant institutional investors have a negative regulatory effect on the relationship between the equity pledge of controlling shareholders and the investment efficiency; However, the negative moderating effect of pressure sensitive institutional investors is not significant. (4) The negative impact of controlling shareholders' equity pledge on investment efficiency is more significant in non-state-owned enterprises, but not significant in state-owned enterprises.

       Finally, based on the above conclusions, this paper proposes that: (1) the regulatory authorities should formulate and improve the information disclosure system of equity pledge, make requirements on the disclosure of information such as the purpose of pledge and the use of funds, and regulate the behavior of shareholders' equity pledge. (2) listed companies should improve their internal governance mechanism and optimize their own ownership structure. (3) we should vigorously develop institutional investors, rationally optimize the proportion of institutional investors, improve the external governance mechanism, and promote the sustainable development of enterprises.

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