随着技术创新在经济转型过程中的战略地位日益凸显，创新型国家建设取得显著成效，企业作为技术创新体系建设的主体，其创新能力和创新绩效一直备受关注。然而，研发活动的外部性与研发资金的长期高额消耗造成了企业创新动力的不足，为了激发企业创新积极性，政府通过研发补贴有效缓解了企业研发资金的压力，同时有利于弥补技术创新的外部性损失，但研发补贴能否对创新绩效产生促进作用尚未定论。此外，创新绩效不仅依赖于企业的资源禀赋状态，更受到企业高管决策意愿和激励机制的影响，而在研发补贴对创新绩效的影响过程中高管激励是否能起到调节效应，且随着企业所有制性质不同高管激励的调节效应又是否会产生差异，这些问题都亟待研究和解决。
       基于此，本文在梳理相关文献的基础上，结合市场失灵理论、技术创新理论、委托代理理论与激励理论，分析了研发补贴对创新绩效的作用过程以及高管激励对该过程产生的影响。然后，本文以深交所2015-2019年间中小板上市公司作为研究样本，运用分层回归法和分组回归法研究在不同所有制企业中研发补贴对创新绩效的影响以及高管激励对二者关系的调节效应。研究结果表明：（1）政府对企业研发补贴的增加有利于提升企业的创新绩效；（2）在全样本企业中，高管薪酬激励与高管股权激励均能够对研发补贴与创新绩效的关系产生正向调节效应，进一步研究表明，随着企业所有制性质的不同，高管激励的调节效应也存在差异；（3）在国有企业中，高管薪酬激励对研发补贴与创新绩效的关系产生负向调节效应，而高管股权激励在研发补贴与创新绩效的关系中并不能够产生显著的调节效应。（4）在非国有企业中，高管薪酬激励与高管股权激励均能够对研发补贴与创新绩效的关系起到正向调节效应。最后，基于上述研究结论，本文从政府和企业两个层面提出了相应的对策建议，以期为合理配置研发资源、优化高管激励制度以及提升企业创新绩效提供一定的参考。

With the increasingly prominent strategic position of technological innovation in the process of economic transformation, the construction of an innovative country has achieved remarkable results. As the main body of technological innovation system construction, enterprises have always been concerned about their innovation capabilities and innovation performance. However, the externality of R&D activities and the long-term high consumption of R&D funds have caused the lack of innovation motivation of enterprises. In order to stimulate the enthusiasm of enterprises for innovation, the government has effectively alleviated the pressure on R&D funds of enterprises through R&D subsidies, and at the same time helps to make up for the external losses of technological innovation. However, whether R&D subsidies can promote innovation performance has not yet been determined. In addition, innovation performance is not only dependent on the state of resource endowment, but also affected by the decision-making willingness and incentive mechanism of corporate executives. In the process of the impact of R&D subsidies on innovation performance, whether executive incentives can have an adjustment effect, and whether the adjustment effect of executive incentives will have a difference with the different nature of enterprise ownership, all these issues need to be studied and resolved urgently.
Based on this, this paper analyzes the process of R&D subsidies on innovation performance and the impact of executive incentives on the process by combining market failure theory, technological innovation theory, principal-agent theory and incentive theory on the basis of combing relevant literature. Then, this paper takes the SME(small and medium-sized enterprise)board listed companies of Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2015 to 2019 as the research samples, using hierarchical regression method and group regression method to study the impact of R&D subsidies on innovation performance ownerships and the adjustment effect of executive incentives on the relationship between them in enterprises of different ownership. The research results show that: (1) The increase in government R&D subsidies to enterprises is conducive to improving the innovation performance of enterprises; (2) In the full sample of enterprises, both executive compensation incentives and executive equity incentives can have a positive adjustment effect on the relationship between R&D subsidies and innovation performance. Further research shows that the adjustment effect of executive incentives varies with the different ownership nature of enterprises; (3) In state-owned enterprises, executive compensation incentives have a negative adjustment effect on the relationship between R&D subsidies and innovation performance, while executive equity incentives cannot have a significant adjustment effect on the relationship between R&D subsidies and innovation performance. (4) In non-state-owned enterprises, both executive compensation incentives and executive equity incentives can have a positive adjustment effect on the relationship between R&D subsidies and innovation performance. Finally, based on the above research conclusions, this article puts forward corresponding countermeasures and suggestions from both the government and the enterprise levels, in order to provide some reference for the rational allocation of R&D resources, the optimization of the executive incentive system and the improvement of enterprise innovation performance.

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