为了解决委托代理矛盾，同时为了吸引核心人才，股权激励作为一种长期激励制度在企业治理中得到了广泛应用。在十四五规划中，科技创新被赋予了战略性地位，医药企业作为科技创新的重要载体之一，受到了广泛的关注；医药企业研发周期长且具有高度依赖人力和知识资源的特点，并随着医疗改革的推进，药企的竞争愈发激烈。股权激励相较于工资和奖金等短期激励制度而言，会更加适合医药企业，它可以更好的帮助企业激发员工的工作积极性，吸引并稳固核心人才，提高企业竞争力，促进企业的长远发展。由于每个企业的实际情况及激励方案等因素存在不同，股权激励实施效果也存在差异，因此，对企业股权激励实施效果进行评价，进而找出股权激励存在的不足并提出针对性建议，有利于企业更高效的运用股权激励，最大程度的发挥股权激励实施效果。

论文以LZ集团为研究对象，深入剖析其股权激励实施效果。首先，通过阅读大量文献分析股权激励的研究现状，并将论文中提及的概念及相关理论做出界定与解析。其次，分析医药企业LZ集团的基本情况，对LZ集团实施股权激励的动因和四次股权激励方案进行深入剖析。第三，依据LZ集团实施股权激励的动因、并参考相关权威性文件以及阅读硕士论文及核心期刊，进行指标的选取并构建股权激励实施效果评价指标体系。评价涵盖了基于单项财务指标、基于熵值法的综合财务指标和基于非财务指标的评价。评价结果表明：股权激励整体上能够促进LZ集团财务及非财务业绩的增长，但是存在激励效果不显著、长期激励效果欠佳、指标发展片面及市场对股权激励的反应不积极等现象。第四，基于评价结果得出：LZ集团的股权激励存在股票授予额度偏低、激励有效期较短、业绩考核指标不全面及监管机制不健全等不足。并针对不足提出了相对应的改进建议：提高股票授予额度、延长激励有效期、增加业绩考核指标以及完善企业监管机制，以便于LZ集团后续实施股权激励可以取得更好的激励效果，同时为其他企业实施股权激励提供了借鉴参考。最后，得出论文的结论，找出论文研究的不足之处并提出对相关研究的展望。

In order to solve the principal-agent conflict and attract core talents, equity incentive as a long-term incentive system has been widely used in corporate governance. In the 14th Five-Year Plan, scientific and technological innovation has been given a strategic position, and pharmaceutical enterprises, as one of the important carriers of scientific and technological innovation, have been widely concerned; Pharmaceutical enterprises have a long research and development cycle and are highly dependent on human and knowledge resources, and with the advancement of medical reform, the competition of pharmaceutical enterprises is becoming increasingly fierce. Compared with the short-term incentive system such as salary and bonus, equity incentive is more suitable for pharmaceutical enterprises. It can better help enterprises stimulate the enthusiasm of employees, attract and stabilize core talents, improve the competitiveness of enterprises, and promote the long-term development of enterprises. Due to the different factors such as the actual situation and incentive plan of each enterprise, the implementation effect of equity incentive is also different. Therefore, evaluating the implementation effect of equity incentive of enterprises, and then finding out the shortcomings of equity incentive and putting forward targeted suggestions are conducive to enterprises' more efficient use of equity incentive and maximize the implementation effect of equity incentive.

This paper takes LZ Group as the research object and deeply analyzes the implementation effect of equity incentive. First of all, by reading a lot of literature to analyze the research status of equity incentive, and the concept and related theories mentioned in the paper to define and analyze. Secondly, it analyzes the basic situation of LZ Group, a pharmaceutical enterprise, and makes an in-depth analysis of the motivation and four equity incentive schemes of LZ Group. Thirdly, according to the motivation of the implementation of equity incentive in LZ Group, and by referring to relevant authoritative documents, reading master's theses and core journals, the indicators are selected and the evaluation index system of the implementation effect of equity incentive is constructed. The evaluation includes the evaluation based on single financial index, the comprehensive financial index based on entropy method and the evaluation based on non-financial index. The evaluation results show that equity incentive can promote the growth of LZ Group's financial and non-financial performance on the whole, but there are some phenomena, such as insignificant incentive effect, poor long-term incentive effect, one-sided indicator development and market reaction to equity incentive. Fourthly, based on the evaluation results, it can be concluded that the equity incentive of LZ Group has some shortcomings, such as low stock grant amount, short incentive validity period, incomplete performance evaluation indicators and imperfect supervision mechanism. In view of the shortcomings, corresponding improvement suggestions are put forward: increasing the quota of stock grants, extending the validity period of incentives, increasing performance assessment indicators and improving the corporate supervision mechanism, so that LZ Group can achieve better incentive effects in the follow-up implementation of equity incentives, and provide a reference for other enterprises to implement equity incentives. Finally, it draws the conclusion of the paper, finds out the shortcomings of the research and puts forward the prospect of related research.

[1]柳婷.我国上市公司股权激励机制文献综述[J].环渤海经济瞭望,2020,308(05):21-22.

[2]刘华.《上市公司股权激励管理办法(试行)》解读[J].财务与会计,2006,330(06):15-17.

[3]上市公司股权激励管理办法[J].中华人民共和国国务院公报,2016,1572(33):65-74.

[4]吴凡.股权激励制度的历史解读与法律构建——以晋商“顶身股”为视角[J].河北大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2022,47(02):135-145.

[5]程婷.新证券法视角下员工持股发行豁免的路径探究[D].北京外国语大学,2022.

[6]Ross S A. Compensation, Incentives, and the Duality of Risk Aversion and Riskiness[J]. The Journal of Finance,2004,59(1):207-225.

[7]Fang H, Nofsinger J R, Quan J. The Effects of Employee Stock Option Plans on Operating Performance in Chinese Firms[J].Journal of Banking & Finance,2015,54(5):141-159.

[8]Imes M, Anderson R. Executive Risk-taking and the Agency Cost of Debt[J].Journal of Empirical Finance,2021,64:78-94.

[9]Bhuyan R, Butchey D, Haar J, et al. CEO Compensation and Firm Performance in the Insurance Industry[J]. Managerial Finance,2022,48(7):1086-1115.

[10]Xia H. The Impact of Equity Incentives on the Performance of Listed Companies[J]. Frontiers in Business, Economics and Management,2023,11(2):179-187.

[11]Spalt O G. Probability Weighting and Employee Stock Options[J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2013,48(04):1085-1118.

[12]Gopalan R, Huang S, Maharjan J. The Role of Deferred Equity Pay in Retaining Managerial Talent[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,2021,38(4):2521-2554.

[13]Jiao Y, Wang Y, Azaare J. Impact of Core Employee Equity Incentive on Enterprise Performance[J].Technology and Investment,2022,13(4):105-120.

[14]Bebchuk L A, Fried J M, Walker D I. Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation[J].University of Chicago Law Review,2002,69(3):751-846.

[15]Chang X, Kang F, Wenrui Z, et al. Non-Executive Employee Stock Options and Corporate Innovation[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2015,(115):60-79.

[16]Shahzad U, Luo F, Pang T, et al. Managerial Equity Incentives Portfolio and the Moral Hazard of Technology Investment[J].Technology Analysis & Strategic Management,2021, 33(12):1435-1449.

[17]Du Y. Research on the Motivation and Effect of Equity Incentive of Huiding Technology[J].Journal of Innovation and Development,2023,3(3):52-54.

[18]Jones C D, Jolly P M, Lubojacky C J, et al. Behavioral Agency and Corporate Entrepreneurship: CEO Equity Incentives & Competitive Behavior[J].International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal,2019,15(3):1017-1039.

[19]Xu X L, Shen T, Zhang X, et al. The Role of Innovation Investment and Executive Incentive on Financial Sustainability in Tech-capital-labor Intensive Energy Company: Moderate Effect[J].Energy Reports,2020,6:2667-2675.

[20]Fang W, Jin S. A Study on Equity Incentive Schemes of Wangsu Technology Enterprises [J].Asia-pacific Journal of Convergent Research Interchange,2020,6(10):65-76.

[21]Hou W, Lovett S, Rasheed A. Stock Option Pay Versus Restricted Stock: A Comparative Analysis of Their Impact on Managerial Risk-taking and Performance Extremeness[J]. Strategic Organization,2020,18(2):301-329.

[22]Wu J, Liu B, Zeng Y, et al. Good for the firm, Good for the society? Causal evidence of the Impact of Equity Incentives on a Firm's Green Investment[J].International Review of Economics & Finance,2022,77:435-449.

[23]Cook W D, Ramon N, Ruiz J L, et al. DEA-based Benchmarking for Performance Evaluation in Pay-for-performance Incentive Plans[J].Omega,2019,84(4):45-54.

[24]Gan H, Park M S, Suh S H. Non-financial Performance Measures, CEO Compensation, and Firms’ Future Value[J].Journal of Business Research,2020,110:213-227.

[25]Loyola G, Portilla Y. Managerial Compensation as a Double-edged Sword: Optimal Incentives under Misreporting[J].International Review of Economics & Finanace,2020, 69:994-1017.

[26]Tang J, Mei Y, Hu X. Do Executive Equity Incentives Improve the Efficiency of Corporate Investment? An Empirical Analysis from Chinese Listed Companies[J].Sci. J. Econ. Manage.Res,2021,3(6):195-208.

[27]Chen C, Hassan A. Management Gender Diversity, Executives Compensation and Firm Performance[J].International Journal of Accounting & Information Management,2022, 30(1):115-142.

[28]Chen M. Research on the Influence of Equity Incentive on the Performance of Listed Companies[J].World Scientific Research Journal,2022,8(3):158-169.

[29]Zhao L. Research on the Impact of Stock Incentives on Firm Innovation Performance[J]. Frontiers in Business, Economics and Management,2023,7(3):99-107.

[30]Mazur M, Salganik-Shoshan G. The Effect of Executive Stock Option Delta and Vega on the Spin-off Decision[J].The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance,2019,72:132-144.

[31]Zhou B, Li Y, Sun F, et al. Executive Compensation Incentives, Risk Level and Corporate Innovation[J].Emerging Markets Review,2021,47:100798.

[32]Santore R, Tackie M. Equity-based Incentive Contracts and Behavior: Experimental Evidence[J].Managerial and Decision Economics,2017,38(8):1194-1200.

[33]Xu X L, Shen T, Zhang X, et al. The Role of Innovation Investment and Executive Incentive on Financial Sustainability in Tech-capital-labor Intensive Energy Company: Moderate Effect[J].Energy Reports,2020,6:2667-2675.

[34]Chendra E, Sidarto K A. An Improved of Hull-White Model for Valuing Employee Stock Options(ESOs)[J].Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting,2020,54(2),651-669.

[35]Liu X. The Impact of Executive Incentive on Enterprise Performance: A Case Study of Liquor Enterprises[J]. Frontiers in Business, Economics and Management,2023,7(3):223-229.

[36]吴娟,俞静.股权激励度与公司绩效相关性研究——基于沪市上市公司数据[J].重庆理工大学学报(自然科学版),2017,(6):198-204．

[37]程果.股权激励的真实盈余管理及其激励效果[J].系统工程,2020,38(01):120-130.

[38]黄钦.股权激励对上市公司绩效的影响研究——以A集团为例[J].会计师,2023(06):10-12.

[39]黄海燕,周明钰,季博.股权激励模式与企业创新绩效研究——以信维通信为例[J].财会通讯,2021(22):167-172.

[40]马健健,康进军.高管股权激励、企业财务绩效与代理成本[J].商业会计,2022(02):90-94.

[41]曹翠娟.高新企业股权激励动因及方案优化研究[J].中国市场,2023(34):82-85+186.

[42]曹艳蓉,齐红玉,李冰慧.股权激励是否提升了国企绩效？——基于企业异质性和契约异质性的经验证据[J].中国注册会计师,2023(07):47-58.

[43]陈艳艳.“人才争夺战”视角下地理位置对股权激励的影响研究[J].世界经济文汇,2021(03):53-70.

[44]李梓,王艺璇.科林电气股权激励实施效果及激励完善[J].财务与会计,2022(24):29-31.

[45]杜慧霞.基于公司竞争战略的股权激励设计研究[J].财会通讯,2022(12):114-119.

[46]刘娇娆.科创板企业第二类限制性股票激励动因及实施效果——以乐鑫科技为例[J].财会月刊,2024,45(10):99-107.

[47]陈效东.谁才是企业创新的真正主体:高管人员还是核心员工[J].财贸经济,2017,38(12):127-144.

[48]封海燕.股权激励与企业技术创新:激励效应还是福利效应[J].价格理论与实践,2020(05):137-140+175.

[49]陶冠宇.华为虚拟股权激励对其创新活动的促进作用研究[J].河北企业,2023,403(02):79-82.

[50]朱砚秋,杨力.股权激励:是高管独享还是全员持股？——基于《关于上市公司实施员工持股计划试点的指导意见》的思考.[J]财会通讯,2017(18):80-85.

[51]王宽.安徽自贸区科技创新人才实施股权激励对企业价值的影响探究——基于Z公司的案例分析[J].商讯,2021,251(25):76-78.

[52]王斌,黄娜,张晨宇.中国上市公司股权激励:现状与讨论[J].财务研究,2022(01):23-37.

[53]倪艳,胡燕.股权激励强度对企业绩效的影响——以A股上市公司为例[J].江汉论坛,2021(04):17-27.

[54]李珍.股权激励对上市公司绩效影响的实证研究——基于激励强度、模式、对象的进一步分析[J].中国证券期货,2021(03):67-78.

[55]谢谦,汪雪婷.以企业创新发展推进共同富裕——基于股权激励的视角[J].金融经济学研究,2022,37(01):101-117.

[56]韩旭,王晓天.股权激励模式及创新绩效分析——以北方华创为例[J].企业管理,2023(05):120-123.

[57]石琦,肖淑芳,吴佳颖.股票期权及要素设计与企业创新产出——基于风险承担与业绩激励效应的研究[J].南开管理评论.2020,32(02):27-38.

[58]顾秀敏.公司治理结构与股权激励行权业绩条件设定[J].江苏商论,2020,24(12):103-106.

[59]张新一,谢德仁,崔宸瑜.企业风险承担的微观机制设计——基于股权激励行权业绩条件达标难度的分析[J].经济学,2024,24(01):220-236.

[60]林琳.税收负担、高管双重激励与企业财务绩效——兼论CSR的中介效应[J].财会通讯,2021(20):56-60.

[61]吴燕天.创新投入中介视角下的股权激励与财务绩效——基于科技型与非科技型企业的对比研究[J].财会通讯,2021(14):39-43.

[62]李晓涛,段杰虎.环境不确定性、高管激励与企业技术创新——来自重污染企业的经验数据[J].会计之友,2022(04):88-95.

[63]刘汀.股权激励对企业绩效的影响研究——以A股上市公司为例[J].金融文坛,2023(08):115-117.

[64]张继德,张馨予,王昊.科创板股权激励与企业创新绩效传导机制研究[J].会计之友,2024(02):53-61.

[65]李怀建,耿晓晗.研发投入、高管激励与企业绩效——基于我国上市公司的实证研究[J].哈尔滨商业大学学报(社会科学版),2021(06):36-48.

[66]陈丽萍.落实股权激励对绩效的影响推动企业健康发展[J].现代企业,2023(12):53-55.

[67]李志学,袁徐洁.新能源上市公司股权激励对财务绩效的影响——基于多时点DID模型[J].北方经贸,2023(03):78-84.

[68]武帅帅.股权激励对上市公司财务绩效的影响研究[J].金融经济,2019(06):221-222.

[69]张精,丁溢桢.高管激励对企业绩效的影响研究——基于中小板上市企业的经验数据[J].江苏商论,2021(02):117-119.

[70]周利琼,袁桂秋.基于不完全契约视角的股权激励绩效研究[J].中国软科 学,2024(S1):394-400.