信息不对称与代理成本问题是股份制企业运行中的难点，股权激励作为缓解委托代理冲突的措施应运而生。然而，因股权激励实施不当而引发的过度盈余管理问题也如影随形，甚至发展为财务舞弊，对证券市场、投资者造成了难以逆转的不良影响。内部控制作为保证企业合法合规、高效运营的有效治理机制，其完善程度不仅会影响企业的管理运营效率，也会影响企业的盈余质量。基于此，研究股权激励、内部控制质量对盈余管理的影响十分必要。

       本文结合委托代理理论、利益趋同假说以及激励理论，在总结与分析国内外现有研究的基础上，对股权激励、内部控制质量与盈余管理两两之间的关系以及内部控制质量所发挥的中介作用进行了机理分析。然后，以2006-2019年我国实施股权激励计划的A股上市公司为样本，运用多元线性回归对三者之间的关系进行了实证分析，并进一步探讨了三者关系在不同产权性质企业中的差异性问题。最后，通过替换真实盈余管理衡量方式并更改部分控制变量的方法对回归结果进行了稳健性检验。研究结果表明：（1）股权激励对内部控制质量和真实盈余管理均具有显著的正向激励作用，且这种激励作用在非国有企业中更为显著，而在国有企业中并不显著；（2）内部控制质量对两种盈余管理方式的影响存在差异，虽然可以显著地约束应计盈余管理，但对真实盈余管理并不能发挥良好的治理作用，反而导致其显著上升；（3）内部控制质量在股权激励与真实盈余管理之间具有部分中介效应，股权激励程度越高，管理层越重视内部控制的制定和维护，但内部控制的完善将降低应计盈余管理操纵空间，管理层转而采取真实盈余管理手段，这一中介作用在非国有企业中同样得到了验证，而在国有企业中无法验证。

       最后，根据实证结论，本文从监管部门与企业两个层面提出对策建议。如监管部门应加强对真实盈余管理行为和信息披露不规范的惩罚力度，引导企业合理实施股权激励；企业应针对真实盈余管理优化内部控制制度，并设计更有效的、动态科学的股权激励方案，例如在行权业绩条件中融入创新绩效、研发投入和市场表现等非财务指标。

        Information asymmetry and agency cost are the difficulties in the operation of joint-stock enterprises. Equity incentive arises as a measure to alleviate the principal-agent contradiction. However, the problem of excessive earnings management caused by improper equity incentive also appears, and even develops into financial fraud, which has an adverse impact on the securities market and investors that is difficult to reverse. Internal control, as an effective governance mechanism to ensure the legal compliance and efficient operation of enterprises, will not only affect the management and operation efficiency of enterprises, but also affect the quality of earnings of enterprises. Based on this, it is necessary to study the influence of equity incentive and internal control quality on earnings management.

        Based on the summary and analysis of domestic and foreign existing research about equity incentive and the quality of internal control and earnings management, this paper studies the relationship between equity incentive, internal control quality and earnings management, and discusses the mediating effect of internal control quality with the principal-agent theory, interest convergence theory and incentive theory. Then, taking the A-share listed companies that implemented the equity incentive plan from 2006 to 2019 as samples, this paper uses multiple linear regression to discuss the relationship between the three, and further explores the differences of the relationship between the three in enterprises with different property rights. Finally, the robustness of the regression results is tested by replacing the measurement method of real earnings management. The results show that :(1) Equity incentive has a significant positive effect on both internal control and real earnings management, which is also verified in non-state-owned enterprises, but these two relationships are not obvious in state-owned enterprises; (2) The influence of internal control quality on the two earnings management modes is different. Although it can significantly constrain accrual earnings management, it can not play a good governance role on real earnings management, but leads to its significant increase; (3) The quality of internal control has a partial mediating effect between equity incentive and real earnings management. Equity incentive may induce real earnings management due to the improvement of internal control quality, which is also verified in non-state-owned enterprises, but its mediating effect cannot be verified in state-owned enterprises.

        Finally, according to the empirical conclusions, countermeasures and suggestions are put forward from the perspectives of regulators and enterprises. For example, the government should strengthen the punishment measures for earnings management behavior and non-standard information disclosure, and correctly guide enterprises to implement equity incentive; Enterprises should optimize the formulation and implementation of internal control system for real earnings management, and design more effective dynamic and scientific equity incentive scheme, such as integrating innovation performance, research and development investment and market performance indicators into the exercise right conditions.

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