党的十八届三中全会明确提出积极发展混合所有制经济，并将其作为我国基本经济制度的重要实现形式。国有企业混合所有制改革不仅有利于优化企业内部治理结构，建立健全管理机制，激发企业内生活力；同时也有利于各种所有制资本优势互补，互惠互利，形成国有资本与民营资本双赢的格局。混合所有制改革作为国企改革中的重要组成部分，近年来不断深化，其混合所有制改革的成效如何，值得进行深入的研究与探索。

      在混合所有制改革的大背景下，本文选取安泰科技作为研究对象，通过对国有企业混改相关文献进行梳理，在产权理论、委托代理理论、战略联盟理论以及协同效应理论的基础上，运用案例分析法对安泰科技混改的动因进行研究，并对混改过程进行梳理，运用因子分析法及相关指标对安泰科技混改的效果进行分析。研究发现：（1）安泰科技的混改动因主要包括外部驱动因素和内部驱动因素。外部驱动因素包括多方政策支持及行业转型升级需求；内部驱动因素包括优化股权结构、完善内部治理机制、提升企业经营业绩、增强核心竞争力等。（2）在安泰科技的混改效果方面，从公司治理方面看，安泰科技从根本上优化了内部决策机制与法人治理结构，形成了相互制衡、相互促进的局面；从经营业务方面看，安泰科技聚合战略投资者的优质资源，优化了核心业务与资源要素，提升了企业核心竞争力；从企业绩效方面看，安泰科技混改在一定程度上提升了财务绩效，增强了企业创新能力。（3）安泰科技成功实施混改，取得较为理想的成绩离不开三个关键因素。一是安泰科技选择与企业发展战略相匹配的战略投资者；二是安泰科技在优化股权的基础上，真正的做到了“改机制”，让非国有资本充分融入企业的内部治理机制；三是安泰科技前瞻布局未来产业板块，围绕核心业务做大做强。

       基于以上研究，本文建议国有企业在混改时应严格筛选战略投资者；重视混改后业务资源的整合与管理机制的建设；有效发挥员工持股计划在混改中的作用，以期能够为其他国有企业在混改实践中提供一定的借鉴。

      The Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee clearly put forward the active development of mixed ownership economy and made it an important form of realisation of China's basic economic system. The reform of mixed ownership in state-owned enterprises is not only conducive to optimising the internal governance structure of the enterprises, establishing a sound management mechanism and stimulating the internal dynamics of the enterprises; it is also conducive to the complementary advantages and mutual benefits of the capital of various ownership systems, forming a win-win situation for both state-owned capital and private capital. As an important part of the reform of state-owned enterprises, mixed ownership reform has been deepening in recent years, and it is worth studying and exploring in depth how effective it has been.

      Under the background of mixed ownership reform, this paper selects Advanced Technology & Materials Co. Ltd as the research object. By combing through the literature related to the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises, based on the theory of property rights, the theory of principal-agent, the theory of strategic alliance and the theory of synergistic effect, it uses the case study method to study the motives of Advanced Technology & Materials Co. Ltd's mixed ownership reform and comb through its process, and uses the factor analysis method and relevant indicators to analyse the effect of Advanced Technology & Materials Co. Ltd's mixed ownership reform. The study found: (1) The motivation for Advanced Technology & Materials Co. Ltd's mixed ownership reform mainly includes external driving factors and internal driving factors. External driving factors include multiple policy support and industry transformation and upgrading needs; internal driving factors include optimizing the shareholding structure, improving internal governance mechanism, enhancing corporate operating performance and strengthening core competitiveness. (2) In terms of the effect of Advanced Technology & Materials Co. Ltd's implementation of mixed ownership reform, from the perspective of corporate governance, Advanced Technology & Materials Co. Ltd has fundamentally optimized the internal decision-making mechanism and corporate governance structure, forming a situation of mutual checks and balances and mutual promotion; from the perspective of business operation, Advanced Technology & Materials Co. Ltd has aggregated high-quality resources of strategic investors, optimized its core business and resource elements, and enhanced the core competitiveness of the enterprise; from the perspective of performance, Advanced Technology & Materials Co. Ltd has improved financial performance to a certain extent and enhanced the Enterprise innovation ability. (3) Advanced Technology & Materials Co. Ltd's successful implementation of mixed-ownership reform is inseparable from three key factors: the first is that Advanced Technology & Materials Co. Ltd selects strategic investors that match the company's development strategy; the second is that on the basis of optimizing equity, Advanced Technology & Materials Co. Ltd has truly achieved "reform mechanism", allowing non-state-owned capital to fully integrate into the internal governance mechanism of the enterprise; the third is Advanced Technology & Materials Co. Ltd is forward-looking layout of future industrial sectors, around the core business to strengthen.

      Based on the above research, this paper suggests that state-owned enterprises should strictly screen strategic investors during the mixed ownership reform; pay attention to the integration of business resources and the construction of management mechanisms after the mixed reform; effectively play the role of employee share ownership plan in the mixed reform, in order to provide some reference for other state-owned enterprises in the practice of mixed reform.

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