随着创新驱动发展战略的深入实施，我国技术创新能力显著提高，但仍与发达国家存在一定差距。在此背景下，企业作为创新主体，更应主动承担起技术创新的重任，加大技术创新的投入力度。而技术创新投入是管理者经营决策的结果，必然受到企业所处制度环境的影响。在制度环境发生变化时，企业要想提高技术创新投入，就需要及时做出相应的管理决策。在这一过程中，高管作为企业运营的代理人，起着尤为重要的作用。因此，企业需要对高管进行适当的激励，来鼓励高管进行创新。可见，高管激励会对制度环境影响企业技术创新投入的过程产生作用，但是，这一作用是否是中介作用，且随着企业规模的不同又是否会产生差异，这些问题都亟待研究和解决。

本文以2016年至2020年我国创业板上市公司为研究对象，探究制度环境对技术创新投入的影响以及高管激励在其中的中介作用，并进一步研究企业规模对高管激励中介作用的影响。首先，阐述研究背景及意义，梳理国内外相关文献，阐明研究方法、研究内容与研究创新点，同时概述相关概念与理论基础；其次，在充分借鉴现有研究成果的基础上，从研究假设、变量选取、模型构建等方面制定实证研究方案，并通过实证分析得出以下研究结论：（1）制度环境的优化可以促进企业技术创新投入的提升；（2）制度环境的优化可以促进企业高管激励水平的提升；（3）高管激励的增加可以促进企业技术创新投入的提升；（4）高管激励在良好的制度环境对企业技术创新投入的正向影响中存在中介效应；（5）高管激励在制度环境影响技术创新投入中的中介效应因企业规模不同存在差异：高管薪酬激励在大规模企业和小规模企业中均发挥部分中介效应，且在小规模企业中更加显著；而高管股权激励在小规模企业中存在部分中介效应，在大规模企业中不存在中介效应。最后，基于上述研究结论，从政府和企业两个角度分别提出相关建议，以期为企业建立科学的高管激励机制、提升企业的技术创新投入提供一定借鉴。

With the in-depth implementation of innovative driving development strategies, our country's technological innovation capacity is significantly improved, but still has a certain gap with developed countries. In this context, as an important subject in innovation activities, enterprises should take the initiative to take the responsibility of technological innovation and increase the investment of technological innovation. Enterprise technological innovation investment is the result of managers' business decisions, and it will inevitably be affected by the institutional environment. When there is a change in the institutional environment, in order to improve the level of technology innovation, enterprises need to make a corresponding management strategy in time. In this process, executives act as an agent operated by the company, playing a particularly important role. In view of this, enterprises need to implement suitable incentives to implement high management to enhance the enthusiasm of executives to promote innovation. It can be seen that executive incentives will have some effects on the process of institutional environmental technology innovation investment. However, in the process of the impact of institutional environment on technological innovation investment，whether executive incentives can play a mediation role, and with the enterprise whether the different size will produce differences, these issues are urgently needed to be studied and resolved.

Based on this, the thesis uses the GEM listed by 2016 to 2020 as a research object, to explore the impact of institutional environment on technological innovation investment and execution of executive incentives. At the same time, the thesis further studies the impact of enterprise scale on executive incentives. First of all, the thesis elaborates the research background and significance, summarizes the research results at home and abroad, and combing the relevant concept and theoretical basis. Secondly, based on the analysis of some scholars' research results, the thesis draws the following research conclusions by empirical analysis: (1) Optimization of institutional environment can promote the improvement of enterprise technology innovation investment; (2) Optimization of the institutional environment can promote the improvement of enterprise executives incentive; (3) The increase in executive incentives can promote the improvement of enterprise technology innovation; (4) Executive incentives can have some intermediary effects on the relationship between good institutional environment and enterprise technology innovation investment; (5) As the scale of enterprise is different, executives incentives have differences in the intermediary effects of the institutional environmental impact enterprise technology innovation investment. Executive compensation incentive plays a part of mediating effect in both large-scale and small-scale enterprises. However, executive equity incentive has some mediating effect on the institutional environment and technological innovation input of small-scale enterprises, but has no mediating effect on large-scale enterprises. Finally, based on the above research conclusions, the thesis proposes relevant recommendations from the two perspectives of government and enterprises to provide a certain reference to establish a scientific executive incentive mechanism and enhance the technology innovation investment for enterprises.

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