在碳排放双控举措趋严和国家能源安全统筹保障背景下，煤炭企业作为高碳排放的基础能源企业，其绿色低碳转型是推动所有部门实现双碳目标的关键。碳排放约束可以倒逼煤炭企业绿色低碳转型，但存在动力不足、多主体利益交错等问题，单纯依赖宏观调控和环境保护政策，忽略煤炭企业内部和外部动力的培育，难以实现我国煤炭产业可持续发展。论文综合运用竞争优势理论、演化博弈模型及系统动力学仿真，基于动力要素和动力主体双视角，对双碳目标下煤炭企业绿色低碳发展动力机制展开研究。

首先，通过梳理相关文献提取煤炭企业绿色低碳发展的内部和外部动力，构建煤炭企业--煤炭企业两方演化博弈模型，并对其发展动力及组合作用进行模拟，研究发现：适度的内外部动力作用下煤炭企业两方博弈存在理想策略组合的情形；主导企业拉动、低碳收益、成本牵引等内部动力增加可以提升煤炭企业绿色低碳发展意愿；补贴、惩罚等外部动力的激励效果更大，政府监管起关键作用；动力组合与单一动力相比激励效果更显著。其次，建立中央政府--地方政府--煤炭企业三方静态演化博弈模型，运用系统动力学对模型进行仿真，结果显示静态监管下三方主体行为策略反复波动，不存在演化稳定策略，煤炭企业倾向短期改变污染行为或逃避监管；因此提出中央政府长期监管与地方政府动态环境规制来控制策略波动，并再次进行仿真模拟，结果表明以上两种监管机制可以有效地抑制策略波动性，理想的演化稳定策略为中央、地方政府实施双重“动态”治理，可实现低成本监管并助推煤炭企业低碳转型。最后，论文从多动力组合和多主体协同两个层面提出煤炭企业低碳发展动力提升策略，包括发挥企业规模优势、优化配置资源、培养绿色低碳战略意识，加强政府动态监管、企业跟进环境政策等。

通过以上研究，将助推我国煤炭企业低碳发展及双碳目标实现进程，也可为能源绿色低碳发展动力机制研究提供理论和方法上的支持。

In the context of the tightening of the dual carbon emission control initiatives and the overall protection of national energy security, coal is a basic energy resource with high carbon emissions, and the green and low-carbon transformation of coal enterprises is the key to promote all sectors to achieve the dual carbon goal. Carbon emission constraints can force coal enterprises to green and low-carbon transformation, but there are problems such as insufficient motivation and interlocking interests of multiple subjects, and it is difficult to achieve sustainable development of China's coal industry by relying solely on macro-control and environmental protection policies and ignoring the cultivation of internal and external motivation of coal enterprises. The paper integrated the competitive advantage theory, evolutionary game model and system dynamics simulation, based on the dual perspectives of motivational factors and motivational subjects, investigated the motivational mechanism of green low-carbon development of coal enterprises under the dual carbon objectives, and the main research works and conclusions are as follows:

Firstly, the internal and external dynamics of green low-carbon development of coal enterprises were extracted by combing relevant literature, including market competition, low-carbon benefits, transformation costs, government promotion and other dynamics; the evolutionary game model of coal enterprises-coal enterprises on both sides is constructed, and the roles of key internal and external dynamics and their combinations are simulated, and the study find that: under the role of moderate internal and external dynamics, it is found that: there is an ideal combination of strategies for both sides of the game; the increase of internal dynamics such as pulling by leading enterprises, low-carbon benefits and cost traction can enhance coal enterprises' willingness to develop green and low-carbon; the incentive effect of external dynamics such as subsidies and penalties is greater, and government regulation plays a key role; the incentive effect of the combination of dynamics is more significant compared with that of single dynamics. Secondly, a static evolutionary game model of central government-local government-coal enterprises was established and simulated using system dynamics. The results show that the behavioral strategies of the three subjects fluctuate repeatedly under static regulation and there is no evolutionary stable strategy, and coal enterprises tend to change their polluting behavior in the short term or avoid regulation; therefore, long-term regulation by central government and dynamic environmental regulation by local government are proposed to control the strategy fluctuation. The results show that the above two regulatory mechanisms can effectively suppress the strategy volatility, and the ideal evolutionary stabilization strategy is a dual "dynamic" governance by central and local governments, which can achieve low-cost regulation and promote the low-carbon transformation of coal enterprises. Finally, the paper proposes strategies to enhance the low-carbon development of coal enterprises from two levels of multi-dynamic combination and multi-body synergy, including giving full play to the scale advantage of enterprises, optimizing the allocation of resources, cultivating the awareness of green and low-carbon strategies, strengthening the dynamic government regulation, following up the environmental policies of enterprises, and building a modern market system.

Through the above research, it will help China's coal enterprises to achieve low carbon development and dual carbon goals, and also provide theoretical and methodological support for the study of power mechanism.

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