随着我国经济的快速发展，企业间的竞争越来越激烈，为适应企业发展的需要，越来越多的企业实施了股权激励。股权激励已成为企业近年来迅速发展的一种制度安排，其目的是通过股权激励计划来激发员工的工作积极性和创造性，从而实现企业改善业绩、提升创新能力、吸引人才和降低代理成本等目的。然而，在实际运作中，企业股权激励面临着一系列问题，这些问题可能会影响到激励方案的有效性和企业绩效的提升。由于股权激励模式和激励股份来源的不同，企业还可能出现股权结构不稳定等问题，从而影响到股权激励的效果。在并购频发的资本市场竞争中，如何维持好现有股权结构稳定，保护股东权益，同时又能很好地激励企业员工，改善公司业绩，成为众多企业的难题。因此，一些上市公司通过股份回购，将资本运作手段与股权激励相结合，探索一种新颖的股权激励模式。本文以实施回购式股权激励的汇中股份为研究对象，研究其实施回购式股权激励的动因，并分析其激励期间所带来的效果，探究汇中股份实施的回购式股权激励计划有效性，为其他企业提供借鉴。

首先，本文对股权激励动因、股权激励模式、激励股份来源和股权激励效果的国内外研究和有关概念进行了梳理。其次，结合相关理论和研究方法对汇中股份实施回购式股权激励的动因和效果进行了分析。研究得到：（1）由于汇中股份前十大股东中有八位持股比例在2%左右，为防止股权被稀释，董事会集体决定采用回购获得激励计划股份；同时利用回购控制企业自由现金流，预防高管保守经营；通过激励计划实现企业长远发展和转型升级的战略。（2）汇中股份财务综合业绩提升明显，行业排名提高。但是，由于股权激励解锁指标以营业收入为单一评价对象，因此仅对企业的盈利能力提升较为明显。（3）汇中股份在股权激励期间创新绩效显著，专利和软著增量变多，企业创新所带来的收益也稳步提升。（4）股权激励增强汇中股份的人才吸引力，研发人员和员工总数增加，学历整体水平提高，员工工作效率逐年提高。（5）汇中股份属于小型民营科技创新企业，投资者对其经营发展持观望态度，回购式股权激励计划并未产生激烈的短期市场效应。

最后，本文结合汇中股份回购式股权激励计划的方案设计和效果，建议小型科技创新型公司在设计股权激励方案时，要注重股权激励模式的创新性和实用性。此外，结合激励对象和发展目标，可以使用多种类型的股权激励计划，并设置多重解锁指标，注重传统的核心人才培养和高管激励的同时，丰富激励对象人群，谋求公司更为全面的发展。

With the rapid development of China 's economy, the competition among enterprises is becoming more and more fierce. In order to meet the needs of enterprise development, more and more enterprises have implemented equity incentives. Equity incentive has become an institutional arrangement for the rapid development of enterprises in recent years. Its purpose is to stimulate the enthusiasm and creativity of employees through equity incentive plans, so as to achieve the purpose of improving performance, enhancing innovation ability, attracting talents and reducing agency costs. However, in actual operation, corporate equity incentives face a series of problems that may affect the effectiveness of incentive programs and the improvement of corporate performance. Due to the difference of equity incentive mode and the source of incentive shares, enterprises may also have problems such as unstable ownership structure, which will affect the effect of equity incentive. In the capital market competition with frequent mergers and acquisitions, how to maintain the stability of the existing equity structure, protect the rights and interests of shareholders, and at the same time motivate employees and improve corporate performance has become a difficult problem for many enterprises. Therefore, some listed companies combine capital operation methods with equity incentives through share repurchases to explore a novel equity incentive model. This paper takes Huizhong which implement repurchase equity incentive as the research object, studies the motivation of implementing repurchase equity incentive, analyzes the effect brought by its incentive period, and explores the effectiveness of the repurchase equity incentive plan implemented by Huizhong, so as to provide reference for other enterprises.

Firstly, this paper combs the domestic and foreign research and related concepts of equity incentive motivation, equity incentive mode, incentive stock source and equity incentive effect. Secondly, combined with relevant theories and research methods, the motivation and effect of Huizhong 's repurchase equity incentive are analyzed. The research shows that : (1) because eight of the top ten shareholders of Huizhong have a shareholding ratio of about 2 %, in order to prevent the dilution of equity, the board of directors collectively decided to use repurchase to obtain incentive plan shares ; at the same time, repurchase is used to control the free cash flow of enterprises and prevent executives from conservative management ; through the incentive plan to achieve long-term development and transformation and upgrading of enterprises strategy. (2) The financial comprehensive performance of Huizhong has improved significantly, and the industry ranking has improved. However, because the equity incentive unlocking index takes operating income as the single evaluation object, it only improves the profitability of the enterprise. (3) During the equity incentive period, the innovation performance of Huizhong is significant, the increment of patents and soft papers is increasing, and the income brought by enterprise innovation is also steadily increasing. (4) Equity incentive enhances the talent attraction of Huizhong, the total number of R & D personnel and employees increases, the overall level of education increases, and the efficiency of employees increases year by year. (5) Huizhong belong to small private science and technology innovation enterprises, investors are wait-and-see attitude to its business development, repurchase equity incentive plan did not produce intense short-term market effect.

Finally, based on the scheme design and effect of Huizhong 's share repurchase equity incentive plan, this paper suggests that small technology innovative companies should pay attention to the innovation and practicability of equity incentive mode when designing equity incentive plan. In addition, combined with the incentive objects and development goals, a variety of types of equity incentive plans can be used, and multiple unlocking indicators can be set up. While focusing on traditional core talent training and executive incentives, the incentive target population can be enriched to seek more comprehensive development of the company.

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