二十一世纪的今天是以高速发达的信息技术为基础的网络发展时代，国内外市场环境变化迅速，对现代企业来说如何快速抓住发展机遇，赢得发展先机是其增强市场竞争力必须要考虑的问题。基于此背景，本文以博弈论、自组织、复杂适应系统为理论基础，分析了没有外部干涉的虚拟企业动态联盟的自组织形成过程并研究了联盟在自组织演化阶段的稳定。具体内容如下：

根据联盟博弈相关理论，本文将市场机遇类比为任务，企业依据所拥有的资源对任务进行发起和响应，考虑到所形成的联盟可能会存在资源冲突和任务冲突，本文设计了一种双向协商算法，综合考虑企业拥有资源的质量和成本以及企业自身的偏好，经过协商重构，最终形成了面向任务的联盟组织结构。

根据虚拟企业联盟的组织特性，本文对联盟组建进行了多智能体仿真，实验结果表明本文提出的协商策略总是能够使联盟达到最优的性能，同时对综合考虑函数中资源质量和成本权重进行调整，使企业合作系统性能得到了改善。

在虚拟企业联盟形成之后，通过对联盟中合作困境的分析，构建了企业间不同诚信策略选择的合作困境博弈模型，设计了带惩罚变量、声誉折现因子、冷酷策略的三种约束机制，有效规范了联盟内企业的行为，从而保证了虚拟企业联盟在自组织演化过程中的稳定运行。

Today in the 21st century is an era of network development based on high-speed and developed information technology. The domestic and foreign market environment changes rapidly. How to quickly seize development opportunities and win development opportunities for modern enterprises is a problem that must be considered to enhance their market competitiveness. Based on this background, this paper analyzes the self-organization formation process of virtual enterprise dynamic alliance without external interference and studies the stability of the alliance in the self-organization evolution stage based on game theory, self-organization and complex adaptive system. The details are as follows:

 According to the theory of alliance game, the market opportunity is analogized as a task, and the enterprise initiates and responds to the task according to its own resources. Considering that the formed alliance may have resource conflicts and task conflicts, this paper designs a two-way negotiation strategy. Considering the quality and cost of the resources owned by the enterprise and the preference of the enterprise itself, after negotiation and reconstruction, the alliance organizational structure that can open the task at any time is finally formed.

 According to the organizational characteristics of virtual enterprise alliance, this paper carries out multi-agent simulation of alliance formation. The experimental results show that the negotiation strategy proposed in this paper can always make the alliance achieve the optimal performance. At the same time, the resource quality and cost weight in the comprehensive consideration function are adjusted, so that the performance of the enterprise cooperation system is further improved.

After the formation of the virtual enterprise alliance, through the analysis of the cooperative dilemma in the alliance, the cooperative dilemma game model of different integrity strategy choices among enterprises is constructed, and three different constraint mechanisms with penalty variables, reputation discount factor and cold strategy are designed to effectively regulate the behavior of enterprises in the alliance, thus ensuring the stable operation of the virtual enterprise alliance in the process of self-organization evolution.

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