论文中文题名: |
混改背景下非国有股东治理对企业全 要素生产率的影响研究
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姓名: |
冯若雯
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学号: |
20202098053
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保密级别: |
保密(1年后开放)
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论文语种: |
chi
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学科代码: |
120201
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学科名称: |
管理学 - 工商管理 - 会计学
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学生类型: |
硕士
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学位级别: |
管理学硕士
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学位年度: |
2023
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培养单位: |
西安科技大学
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院系: |
管理学院
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专业: |
工商管理
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研究方向: |
资本运营与公司理财
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第一导师姓名: |
王新红
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第一导师单位: |
西安科技大学
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论文提交日期: |
2023-06-15
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论文答辩日期: |
2023-06-07
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论文外文题名: |
Research on the Impact of Non-state-owned Shareholder Governance on Total Factor Productivity of Enterprises under the Background of Mixed Reform
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论文中文关键词: |
非国有股东治理 ; 全要素生产率 ; 内部控制质量 ; 环境不确定性 ; 企业生命周期
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论文外文关键词: |
Non-state-owned shareholder governance ; Total factor productivity ; Internal control quality ; Environmental uncertainty ; Enterprise life cycle
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论文中文摘要: |
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全要素产率是衡量高质量发展的重要指标,要想推动高质量发展,提高全要素生产率是关键。国有企业作为中国经济发展的“顶梁柱”和“压舱石”,提升其全要素生产率水平既是推动经济高质量发展的必然要求,也是增强企业综合实力的重要引擎。但目前我国全要素生产率增速放缓,国有企业由于所有者缺位、内部人控制等现象导致全要素生产率有待提高。随着国有企业改革的纵深推进,混合所有制改革已成为新一轮国企改革的重心,非国有股东的引入也对公司治理产生一定影响。那么,非国有股东治理是否会影响国有企业全要素生产率?如果有影响,又通过何种方式实现?以上问题亟须从理论和实证层面进行深入研究。
鉴于此,本文在梳理国内外文献的基础上,结合产权理论、委托代理理论、资源基础理论、信息不对称理论、内部控制理论和企业生命周期理论,分析了非国有股东治理对企业全要素生产率的影响效应和作用机制。然后基于我国2008—2021年A股国有上市公司的非平衡面板数据,运用多元回归分析方法,探究非国有股东治理在股权结构和高层治理两个维度对全要素生产率的影响,并进一步考察两者关系中内部控制质量的中介作用以及环境不确定性和企业生命周期的调节作用。
主要研究结论如下:(1)非国有股东治理能够促进企业全要素生产率的提高,且相较于股权结构维度,高层治理维度上对全要素生产率的正向影响更突出。(2)内部控制质量在非国有股东治理与企业全要素生产率之间发挥中介作用。(3)环境不确定性在非国有股东治理与企业全要素生产率之间发挥正向调节作用。(4)在国有企业生命周期的不同阶段,非国有股东治理对企业全要素生产率的影响具有差异性。(5)对属于竞争性行业或处于低市场化水平地区的国有企业而言,非国有股东治理对企业全要素生产率的促进作用更明显。
最后,根据上述结论,本文为政府和企业提出一系列对策建议,以期为我国进一步深化混合所有制改革、发挥非国有股东治理效应、提升企业全要素生产率、实现经济高质量发展提供一定经验依据。
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论文外文摘要: |
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Total factor productivity is an important index to measure high-quality development. To promote high-quality development, improving total factor productivity is the key. As the "pillar" and "ballast" of China's economic development, state-owned enterprises can enhance their total factor productivity level, which is not only an inevitable requirement to promote high-quality economic development, but also an important engine to enhance the comprehensive strength of enterprises. However, at present, the growth rate of total factor productivity in our country is slowing down. Due to the absence of owners and internal control in state-owned enterprises, total factor productivity needs to be improved. With the deepening of the reform of state-owned enterprises, the reform of mixed ownership has become the focus of a new round of state-owned enterprise reform, and the introduction of non-state-owned shareholders also has certain impact on corporate governance. Then, will the governance of non-state-owned shareholders affect the total factor productivity of state-owned enterprises? If so, in what way? The above problems need to be studied in depth from both theoretical and empirical aspects.
In view of this, on the basis of combing the domestic and foreign literature, this paper analyzes the effect and mechanism of non-state-owned shareholders' governance on total factor productivity of enterprises, combining with property rights theory, principal-agent theory, resource-based theory, information asymmetry theory, internal control theory and enterprise life cycle theory. Then, based on the unbalanced panel data of China's A-share state-owned listed companies from 2008 to 2021, using the method of multiple regression analysis, this paper explores the impact of non-state-owned shareholder governance on total factor productivity in two dimensions of ownership structure and top-level governance, and further examines the mediating role of internal control quality and the moderating role of environmental uncertainty and corporate life cycle in the relationship between the two.
The main research conclusions are as follows: (1) Non-state-owned shareholder governance can promote the improvement of total factor productivity, and compared with the equity structure dimension, the high-level governance dimension has a more prominent positive impact on total factor productivity. (2) The quality of internal control plays an intermediary role between the governance of non-state-owned shareholders and total factor productivity. (3) Environmental uncertainty plays a positive moderating role between non-state-owned shareholder governance and total factor productivity. (4) At different stages of the life cycle of state-owned enterprises, the influence of non-state-owned shareholders' governance on total factor productivity is different. (5) For the state-owned enterprises belonging to competitive industries or regions with low marketization level, the non-state-owned shareholder governance plays a more significant role in promoting the total factor productivity of the enterprises.
Finally, according to the above conclusions, this paper puts forward a series of countermeasures and suggestions for the government and enterprises, with a view to providing some empirical basis for further deepening the reform of mixed ownership, giving play to the governance effect of non-state-owned shareholders, improving the total factor productivity of enterprises and realizing high-quality economic development.
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参考文献: |
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中图分类号: |
F276.1
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开放日期: |
2024-06-15
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