重大突发事件在全球范围内频繁发生，给世界各个国家和地区的发展带来严峻的挑战，也给民众带来了生命财产的安全问题，更严重的是对民众心理产生了不同程度的影响。重大突发事件的发生影响了民众的生产和生活，处理不当极有可能衍生次生危机。随着应急管理各项工作的深入推进，心理危机干预工作逐渐受到社会的关注，党的二十大特别强调要重视心理健康和精神卫生，而心理危机干预监管的不到位会阻碍心理危机干预工作顺利高效开展。因此，本文从政府角度出发，探索如何提高重大突发事件下心理危机干预监管效率与监管水平，以期保障心理危机干预的有效开展。

首先，阐述了心理危机干预与多元网格化监管研究现状，明确演化博弈模型理论和系统动力学的研究内涵与研究步骤，将多元网格化监管分为网格化监管与多元化监管阐述，为后续的模型构建与仿真分析奠定理论基础。

其次，构建心理危机干预监管演化博弈模型。分析网格化心理危机干预监管框架与多元化心理危机干预监管体系，确定演化博弈主体，分析各个主体之间的博弈关系，构建博弈主体收益支付矩阵。运用Matlab2016软件进行复制动态方程、雅可比矩阵的计算，分析博弈主体策略选择的稳定性。建立了涉及13个参数的政府、精神卫生中心演化博弈模型，对两方主体均衡点进行分析，将两方演化博弈策略选择过程分为9种情况进行讨论；考虑到监管主体的多元化，在两方博弈模型中增加民众主体，构建了涉及21个参数的政府、精神卫生中心和民众的演化博弈模型，并对三方主体均衡点进行理论分析，确定了三方主体演化稳定策略，为政府严格监管，精神卫生中心正规干预，民众参与监督为最终稳定状态，得到了影响博弈主体策略选择的9个重要参数。

最后，运用系统动力学进行心理危机干预监管仿真分析并依据分析结果提出建议。运用系统动力学理论，在演化博弈的基础上，通过Vensim软件绘制政府、精神卫生中心和民众系统动力学流图并进行可靠性检验，对参数赋值后进行纯策略、混合策略以及重要参数仿真分析，探讨参数变化对三方主体策略选择的影响程度，并根据博弈分析和仿真结果提出相应的监管建议。

综上，本文通过建立政府与精神卫生中心两方演化博弈模型以及政府、精神卫生中心与民众三方演化博弈模型，确定了影响政府、精神卫生中心和民众策略选择的9个重要参数，通过系统动力学仿真分析了纯策略、混合策略以及9个重要参数对三方博弈主体策略选择的影响程度，并根据仿真分析结果从政府的角度出发对三方博弈主体提出对策建议，从而为提高心理危机干预的效率和监管水平提供理论指导和参考。

Major emergencies occur frequently around the world, posing serious challenges to the development of countries and regions around the world, as well as to the safety of people's lives and property and, more seriously, to their psychological well-being in varying degrees. The occurrence of major emergencies affects people's production and life, and there is a high risk of secondary crises arising from improper handling. With the further advancement of emergency management, psychological crisis intervention is gradually gaining attention from the society. The 20th Party Congress especially emphasised the importance of mental health and mental hygiene, and the lack of supervision of psychological crisis intervention will hinder the smooth and efficient development of psychological crisis intervention. Therefore, this paper explores how to improve the efficiency and level of supervision of psychological crisis intervention under major emergencies from the perspective of the government, with a view to ensuring the effective implementation of psychological crisis intervention.

Firstly, the current situation of research on psychological crisis intervention and multiple grid-based regulation is explained, the research connotation and research steps of evolutionary game model theory and system dynamics are clarified, and multiple grid-based regulation is divided into grid-based regulation and diversified regulation elaborated, laying the theoretical foundation for the subsequent model construction and simulation analysis.

Secondly, the evolutionary game model of psychological crisis intervention regulation is constructed. The framework of grid-based psychological crisis intervention regulation and diversified psychological crisis intervention regulation system were analysed, the evolutionary game subjects were identified, the game relationship between each subject was analysed, and the payoff matrix of the game subjects was constructed. Matlab 2016 software is used to calculate the replication dynamic equation and Jacobi matrix, and to analyse the stability of the strategy choice of the game subjects. The evolutionary game model of the government and the mental health centre involving 13 parameters was established, the equilibrium points of the two subjects were analysed, and the strategy selection process of the two evolutionary game was divided into nine cases for discussion; considering the plurality of regulatory subjects, the people's subjects were added to the two-party game model, and the evolutionary game model of the government, the mental health centre and the people involving 21 parameters was constructed, and the equilibrium points of the three subjects were The theoretical analysis of the equilibrium point of the three subjects determines the evolutionary stabilization strategy of the three subjects, which is the final stabilization state of strict regulation by the government, formal intervention by the mental health centre and participation in supervision by the public, and obtains nine important parameters affecting the strategy choice of the game subjects.

Finally, the paper uses system dynamics to conduct simulation analysis of psychological crisis intervention supervision and puts forward suggestions based on the analysis results. Based on the theory of system dynamics and evolutionary game, Vensim software was used to draw the system dynamics flow diagram of government, mental health center and people and conduct reliability test. After parameter values were assigned, pure strategy, mixed strategy and important parameter simulation analysis were carried out to explore the degree of influence of parameter changes on the strategy selection of the three parties. According to the game analysis and simulation results, the corresponding supervision suggestions are put forward.

In conclusion, by establishing a two-party evolutionary game model between the government and mental health center and a three-party evolutionary game model between the government, mental health center and the public, this paper identifies 9 important parameters that affect the strategy choice of the government, mental health center and the public. Through the system dynamics simulation, the influence degree of pure strategy, mixed strategy and 9 important parameters on the strategy selection of the tripartite game players was analyzed. Based on the simulation analysis results, countermeasures and suggestions were put forward for the tripartite game players from the perspective of the government, so as to provide theoretical guidance and reference for improving the efficiency and supervision level of psychological crisis intervention.

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