股权激励作为一种缓解委托代理矛盾、实现股东和管理者间利益捆绑或达到利益趋同的手段被越来越多的企业采用。近年来，随着企业生产力和生产规模迅猛发展，对企业的管理水平和技术研发能力提出了更高的要求，而股权激励计划对吸引优秀人才、加强人才梯队建设有着积极的作用。因此，对于以创新发展、人才建设为本的高新技术企业而言，实施股权激励势在必行。立讯精密作为高新技术企业先后推出了四期股权激励计划。本文选择在电子元器件行业内具有一定代表性的企业立讯精密为案例研究对象，对其股权激励计划的内容、实施动因以及绩效进行深入的研究。

       本文对现有文献和理论基础进行归纳；分析了立讯精密股权激励计划实施的背景与动因，并对其四期激励计划的调整方向进行梳理；从短期市场反应、财务绩效、非财务绩效三方面出发，分析了股权激励的实施效果。研究结果表明，立讯精密开展股权激励计划之后，短期市场反应方面取得了相对不错的市场反馈；财务绩效方面，实施股权激励对企业盈利能力、营运能力、偿债能力和发展能力的提高产生了积极的影响，也从一定程度上缓解了委托代理矛盾，经济增加值为正也说明股权激励的实施为股东持续创造了价值；非财务绩效方面，股权激励使得企业员工素质整体提高、创新投入与创新产出不断增加、企业市场地位稳步提升，总体来看，立讯精密股权激励计划实施得较为成功。

       通过案例分析，总结立讯精密在股权激励计划设计上的经验，本文认为企业在对股权激励计划进行设计时，应恰当选择激励时点、动态调整激励计划、合理设置解锁比例、设置预留部分期权；立讯精密股权激励计划也存在不足之处，本文提供了三点建议，一是科学设定考核难度；二是设置多元考核指标；三是优化激励考核体系。相关政府部门也应完善资本市场建设、健全相关法律法规，为企业实施股权激励创造更好的环境、为我国企业的发展保驾护航。

本文的研究可以为立讯精密股权激励计划进一步的完善提供参考意见，也可为其他企业实施股权激励提供一定的借鉴。

Equity incentive has been adopted by more and more enterprises as a means to alleviate the principal-agent contradiction and realize the interest binding or interest convergence between shareholders and managers. In recent years, with the rapid development of enterprise productivity and production scale, higher requirements are put forward for enterprise management level and technology research and development ability, and equity incentive plan plays a positive role in attracting outstanding talents and strengthening the construction of talent echelon. Therefore, it is imperative to implement equity incentive for high-tech enterprises based on innovation development and talent construction. Luxshareict as a high-tech enterprise has launched four equity incentive plans. This paper chooses Luxshareict, a representative enterprise in the electronic components industry, is selected as the case study object to conduct an in-depth study on the content, implementation motivation and performance of its equity incentive plan.

This paper summarizes the existing literature and theoretical basis; The background and motivation of the implementation of Luxshareict equity incentive plan are analyzed, and the adjustment direction of the fourth stage incentive plan is sorted out. This paper analyzes the implementation effect of equity incentive from three aspects: short-term market response, financial performance and non-financial performance. The research results show that Luxshareict has achieved relatively good market feedback in terms of short-term market reaction after carrying out the equity incentive plan. In terms of financial performance, the implementation of equity incentive has a positive impact on the improvement of corporate profitability, operating ability, debt paying ability and development ability, and also alleviates the principal-agent conflict to a certain extent. Positive economic added value indicates that the implementation of equity incentive continuously creates value for shareholders. In terms of non-financial performance, equity incentive improves the overall quality of employees, keeps increasing innovation input and output, and steadily improves the market position of enterprises. On the whole, Luxshareict equity incentive plan has been implemented successfully.

Through case analysis, the experience of Luxshareict in the design of equity incentive plan is summarized. This paper believes that when designing equity incentive plan, the enterprise should choose the incentive time properly, dynamically adjust the incentive plan, set the unlocking ratio reasonably and set the reserved part of options. Luxshareict equity incentive plan also has shortcomings, this paper provides three suggestions, one is to scientifically set the difficulty of assessment; Second, set multiple assessment indicators; Third, optimize the incentive assessment system. Relevant government departments should also improve the capital market construction, improve relevant laws and regulations, create a better environment for the implementation of equity incentive for enterprises and escort the development of our enterprises.

The research of this paper can provide reference for the further improvement of Luxshareict equity incentive plan, and also provide some reference for other enterprises to implement equity incentive.

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