在全球气候治理深化与“双碳”目标约束下，电力供应链作为能源系统的关键环节，其减排路径优化成为重要议题。国际能源署（IEA）数据显示，电力行业碳排放占全球总量的40%，而电力供应链协同减排存在显著潜力。本文针对电力供应链企业的单独减排、内部合作减排及基于合同能源管理模式与节能服务公司合作减排三种策略，探讨其减排效果与选择机制。

本文在碳交易机制背景下，首先基于理论角度构建了Stackelberg博弈模型来研究电力供应链的三种减排策略的减排效果，然后通过算例仿真对博弈模型得出的主要结论进行了验证并做了多组参数的敏感性检验，最后为了增强本文结论的可靠性、弥补博弈算例仿真模拟数值的不足，建立了基于J公司真实数据的电力供应链碳减排的系统动力学模型进行不同减排策略下减排效果的情景分析。

研究结果表明：（1）发电商和售电商合作减排以及电力供应链企业与第三方节能服务公司合作减排，这两种合作减排策略都优于单独减排。（2）根据碳减排率和利润的标准，电力供应链减排策略从高到低依次排序为：电力供应链与节能服务公司合作减排＞发电商和售电商合作减排＞单独减排。（3）发电商与售电商合作减排比单独减排产生的总减排量平均提升12%，节能服务公司参与的合作减排比发电商和售电商合作减排产生的总减排量平均提升7%。据此建议电力供应链企业应该加强碳减排合作，通过降低需求预测误差来优化减排效果；电力供应链企业还应该深化与节能服务公司减排合作，把合同能源管理模式纳入公司低碳化转型战略的实施方案。

本文融合了博弈论和系统动力学理论，把节能服务公司引入了电力供应链合作减排研究，把供应链合作减排策略模型拓展至电力行业，丰富了供应链合作减排策略研究，并为电力供应链碳减排策略选择提供了科学决策依据。

In the context of global climate governance and the constraints imposed by "dual carbon" goals, optimizing the emission reduction pathways of the power supply chain—a critical component of the energy system—has become a significant challenge. According to data from the International Energy Agency (IEA), the power sector accounts for approximately 40% of global carbon emissions, underscoring the substantial collaborative emission reduction potential within the power supply chain. This study examines the emission reduction impacts and selection mechanisms of three strategies for power supply chain enterprises: independent emission reduction, internal collaborative emission reduction, and collaborative emission reduction with energy service companies based on the contract energy management model.

Within the framework of the carbon trading mechanism, this paper theoretically develops a Stackelberg game model to analyze the implementation outcomes of the three emission reduction strategies in the power supply chain. Subsequently, it validates the key conclusions of the game model through case simulations and conducts sensitivity analyses across multiple parameter sets. To enhance the robustness of the findings and address the limitations of numerical simulations in the game case, a system dynamics model of carbon emission reduction in the power supply chain is constructed using real data from Company J, enabling scenario-based evaluations of emission reduction effects under varying strategies.

The research findings reveal that: (1) Both collaborative emission reduction approaches—between power generators and power sellers, and between power supply chain enterprises and third-party energy service companies—are more effective than independent emission reduction. (2) Based on carbon emission reduction rates and profitability, the ranking of power supply chain emission reduction strategies from most to least effective is as follows: collaboration between the power supply chain and energy service companies > collaboration between power generators and power sellers > independent emission reduction. (3) On average, the total emission reduction achieved through collaboration between power generators and power sellers exceeds independent emission reduction by 12%, while the total emission reduction achieved through collaboration involving energy service companies surpasses that of generator-seller collaboration by an additional 7%. Based on these insights, it is recommended that power supply chain enterprises strengthen carbon emission reduction cooperation, optimize emission reduction outcomes by minimizing demand prediction errors, and deepen partnerships with energy service companies, integrating the contract energy management model into their low-carbon transformation strategies.

This paper combines game theory and system dynamics theory, introduces energy service companies into the research of power supply chain cooperative emission reduction, and extends the supply chain cooperative emission reduction strategy model to the power industry, which enriches the research of supply chain cooperative emission reduction strategy and provides scientific decision-making basis for the selection of carbon emission reduction strategy in power supply chain.

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