随着改革开放进程的不断推进，我国经济持续高速增长，投资规模也在迅速增加，整个社会频现过度投资、资源浪费、产能过剩等现象，投资效率整体呈下降趋势。为改变这种投资乱象，我国不应过分追求经济的高速增长，而应通过经济转型转向提高经济质量。企业作为市场经济的主体和推动经济转型的重要力量，其融资能力和投资效率备受关注。融资、投资活动是企业财务管理的核心，有效的融资和投资决策将在很大程度上提高企业的资金配置效率、投资效率。其中，债务融资作为重要的融资活动，通常被认为能够有效缓解委托人和代理人的矛盾冲突，发挥减少企业过度投资行为的积极作用。此外，设计合理、有效的薪酬和股权契约是一种有效的高管激励机制，能够促进高管为企业努力工作，抑制过度投资行为。因此，在社会整体投资过热、企业过度投资的情况下，探究债务融资、高管激励与过度投资的关系，能够为企业的健康发展提供一定的参考。

       基于此，本文在梳理国内外相关文献，分析信息不对称理论、委托代理理论和激励理论的基础上，以2015-2020年沪深A股上市公司作为研究对象，探索不同产权性质企业中，债务融资对过度投资的影响以及高管激励在债务融资影响过度投资中的调节效应。实证结果表明：（1）增加债务融资有利于抑制企业的过度投资，按债务异质性分类后，短期负债与商业信用更能显著抑制过度投资；（2）高管薪酬激励和高管股权激励均能够正向调节债务融资对过度投资的负向影响；（3）进一步按照企业产权性质分组后，在非国有企业中，债务融资更能显著抑制过度投资；（4）在非国有企业中，高管薪酬激励和高管股权激励均能够正向调节债务融资对过度投资的负向影响。最后，基于上述研究结论，本文从政府和企业两个层面出发，分别提出相关建议，以期帮助上市公司建立科学的高管激励机制，提高债务融资资金的利用效果，抑制过度投资，最终长期、有效地提升投资效率，增加企业价值。

       With the continuous advancement lor='red'>of the reform and opening-up process, China's economy is growing at a high speed, and the scale lor='red'>of investment is also increasing rapidly. In the whole society, the phenomena lor='red'>of over-investment, waste lor='red'>of resources, excess capacity and so on appear frequently, and the overall investment efficiency shows a downward trend. Therefore, in order to change this kind lor='red'>of investment disorder, our country should not excessively pursue the high-speed growth lor='red'>of the economy, but should improve the economic quality through the economic transformation. As one lor='red'>of the main bodies lor='red'>of the market economy and an important force in promoting economic transformation, enterprises' financing ability and investment efficiency have attracted much attention. Financing and investment activities are the core lor='red'>of financial management, so effective financing and investment decisions will greatly improve the efficiency lor='red'>of enterprise capital allocation and investment. Among them, debt financing, as an important financing activity, is generally considered to be able to effectively ease the conflicts between the principal and the agent, and play a positive role in reducing the excessive investment behavior lor='red'>of enterprises. In addition, the design lor='red'>of reasonable and effective compensation and equity contracts is an effective incentive mechanism for senior managers to work hard for the enterprise and restrain over-investment behavior. Therefore, in the case lor='red'>of over-investment lor='red'>of enterprises and over-investment lor='red'>of society as a whole, to explore the relationship between debt financing, executive incentives and over-investment can provide some reference for the healthy development lor='red'>of enterprises.

       On the basis lor='red'>of combing the relevant literature at home and abroad, analyzing the theory lor='red'>of information asymmetry, principal-agent theory and incentive theory, this thesis takes the A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2015 to 2020 as the research object, this thesis explores the influence lor='red'>of debt financing on over-investment and the moderating effect lor='red'>of executive incentives. The empirical results show that: (1) Increasing debt financing is beneficial to restrain over-investment, and short-term debt and commercial credit can restrain over-investment significantly; (2) Both executive compensation incentive and executive stock incentive can positively adjust the negative effect lor='red'>of debt financing on over-investment; (3) In non-state-owned enterprises, after further grouping according to the property right nature lor='red'>of enterprises, debt financing can significantly restrain excessive investment; (4) In non-state-owned enterprises, both executive compensation incentive and executive stock incentive can adjust the negative effect lor='red'>of debt financing on overinvestment. Finally, based on the above research conclusion, this thesis sets out from the two levels lor='red'>of the government and the enterprise, respectively put forward relevant suggestions, with a view to helping listed companies to establish a scientific incentive mechanism for top executives, improve the use lor='red'>of debt financing funds, inhibit over-investment, and ultimately long-term, effectively enhance the efficiency lor='red'>of investment, increase enterprise value.