面对市场的快速变化、技术进步和全球化竞争加剧的背景下，传统的单一企业独立竞争模式已逐渐不能满足企业的生存和发展需求。因此，虚拟企业作为一种新型的组织形式应运而生，通过企业间的合作与资源共享，增强了企业应对市场变化的灵活性和竞争力。本文通过运用博弈论的子博弈完美均衡理论和经济学的交易成本理论，研究了虚拟企业间动态讨价还价过程的理论基础和实际应用，深入分析了虚拟企业间在完全信息和不完全信息条件下的稳定报价机制。主要研究内容包括两个方面：

首先，详细探讨了完全信息条件下的多人讨价还价模型，包括双边讨价还价、一对多讨价还价和多对多讨价还价模型，阐述了如何利用博弈论中的均衡理论来分析和解决讨价还价过程中的各种问题。特别是对完全信息下拥有不同谈判能力的多人讨价还价模型进行了改进，引入了伙伴匹配机制和谈判能力分析，最终得到参与人在每个时刻稳定的报价策略，更准确地模拟现实中复杂的谈判情景。

接下来针对常见但更加复杂的不完全信息条件下的讨价还价策略进行了深入分析。通过引入 和 两种策略，讨论了如何在买方类型未知的情况下，通过调整谈判策略来优化谈判结果，以及如何运用信念系统，最终得到参与人在每个时刻属于序列均衡的报价策略。这一部分的研究不仅丰富了讨价还价理论的内容，也为解决实际谈判中的信息不对称问题提供了有效的策略。

本文研究多属性谈判模型以应对更复杂的谈判情境，研究动态信息更新机制以提高谈判效率，进一步分析复杂均衡的形成机制。本文为虚拟企业间的动态讨价还价提供了理论基础和策略指导，未来的研究将进一步探索更复杂的谈判情境，通过更精细的模型和先进的技术手段，为企业间的合作提供更为高效和公平的谈判解决方案。

In the face of rapid market changes, technological advancements, and intensified global competition, the traditional model of independent competition by individual enterprises has gradually become inadequate to meet the survival and development needs of companies. Therefore, virtual enterprises, as a new form of organizational structure, have emerged. Through cooperation and resource sharing among enterprises, virtual enterprises enhance flexibility and competitiveness in response to market changes. This article explores the theoretical foundation and practical application of dynamic bargaining processes among virtual enterprises by applying the subgame perfect equilibrium theory of game theory and the transaction cost theory of economics. It delves into the stable pricing mechanisms among virtual enterprises under conditions of complete and incomplete information. The main research content includes two aspects.

First, we explore in detail the multi-party bargaining model under complete information, including bilateral bargaining, one-to-many bargaining, and many-to-many bargaining models. We elaborate on how to use equilibrium theory in game theory to analyze and solve various problems in the bargaining process. In particular, we improve the multi-party bargaining model with different bargaining powers under complete information by introducing a partner matching mechanism and bargaining power analysis. This ultimately results in stable bidding strategies for participants at each time point, more accurately simulating the complex negotiation scenarios in reality.

Next, we conduct an in-depth analysis of common yet more complex bargaining strategies under conditions of incomplete information. By introducing pooling and separating, we discuss how to optimize negotiation outcomes by adjusting bargaining strategies when the buyer's type is unknown and how to use belief systems to ultimately obtain sequential equilibrium bidding strategies for participants at each time point. This part of the study not only enriches the content of bargaining theory but also provides effective strategies for addressing information asymmetry issues in actual negotiations.

This paper studies multi-attribute bargaining models to address more complex negotiation scenarios, and investigates dynamic information updating mechanisms to improve negotiation efficiency. Further analysis is conducted on the formation mechanisms of complex equilibria.

The paper provides a theoretical foundation and strategic guidance for dynamic bargaining between virtual enterprises. Future research will explore more complex negotiation scenarios, employing more refined models and advanced technological methods to provide more efficient and equitable bargaining solutions for inter-enterprise cooperation.