在经济新常态的背景下，创新是推动我国经济实现高质量发展的重要手段，可以使国民经济焕发新的活力。当前我国在创新方面已经取得一定的成果，但与西方发达国家相比仍然存在一定的差距。企业作为微观经济主体，是我国进行创新的主要力量，若要提高其在国际竞争中的话语权与主动权，就必须不断进行创新并提高创新绩效。在影响创新绩效的因素中，薪酬差距作为一种隐性激励方式，能够在一定程度上缓解股东和高管之间的委托代理问题，增强高管团队开展创新活动的意愿，进而对企业创新绩效产生影响。除此之外，内部控制、分析师关注与市场竞争作为重要的企业内外部治理机制，能够有效规范高管的行为并加强企业信息的流动性，同样能够影响企业创新绩效，而它们在薪酬差距对创新绩效的影响中能否起到调节作用，还需要进一步研究。

       鉴于此，本文首先梳理了有关薪酬差距、内部控制、分析师关注以及市场竞争对创新绩效影响的文献，并基于委托代理理论、锦标赛理论、经理人市场理论、公平理论与信息不对称理论，分析了高管内、外部薪酬差距对企业创新绩效的影响以及内部控制、分析师关注和市场竞争在二者关系中的调节效应，并据此提出研究假设。其次，本文整理了我国A股上市企业2016-2020年的数据，运用多元回归法对本文提出的假设进行验证，并得出了相应的结论。同时，本文采用替换变量、替换为Tobit模型以及自变量滞后一期的方法进行了稳健性检验和内生性检验，证实本文的研究结论具有可靠性。研究表明：（1）高管内、外部薪酬差距均能够促进企业创新绩效的提升；（2）内部控制能够加强高管内、外部薪酬差距对企业创新绩效的促进作用；（3）分析师关注会削弱高管内、外部薪酬差距对企业创新绩效的促进作用；（4）市场竞争能够加强高管内、外部薪酬差距对企业创新绩效的促进作用。最后，基于上述研究结论，本文分别从政府和企业两个层面提出有关建议，以期为企业从薪酬制度、内部控制、分析师关注和市场竞争等角度提升创新绩效提供一定的参考。

    In the context of the new normal of China's economic development, innovation can promote the goal of high-quality development of China's economy and can revitalize the national economy. At present, China has achieved certain results in innovation, but there is still a certain gap compared with Western developed countries. As the main body of microeconomics, enterprises are the main force for innovation in China, and if we want to improve the right to speak and take the initiative in international competition, we must continue to innovate and improve innovation performance. As a hidden incentive method, the compensation gap can alleviate the problem of principal-agent to a certain extent, enhance the willingness of senior management teams to carry out innovative activities, and thus have an impact on the innovation performance of enterprises. In addition, internal control, analyst focus and market competition, as important internal and external governance mechanisms of enterprises, can effectively regulate the behavior of executives and strengthen the liquidity of information, which will have a certain impact on innovation performance, and whether they can play a regulatory role in the impact of the compensation gap on innovation performance needs further study.

    In view of this, this paper first sorts out the literature on the impact of compensation gap, internal control, analyst focus and market competition on innovation performance, and analyzes how the internal and external compensation gaps of executives affect the innovation performance of enterprises and the impact of internal control, analyst concern and market competition in the relationship between the two, based on principal-agent theory, championship theory, manager market theory, fairness theory and information asymmetry theory, and puts forward research hypotheses. Secondly, this paper collates the relevant data of China's A-share listed enterprises from 2016 to 2020, and uses the multiple regression method to verify the hypotheses proposed in this paper and draw corresponding conclusions. At the same time, the robustness test and endogenous test are carried out by replacing variables, replacing with Tobit models and independent variable lag phase one, which confirms the reliability of the research conclusions in this paper. The results show that: (1) internal and external compensation gaps of executives can promote the improvement of enterprise innovation performance; (2) internal control can strengthen the role of internal and external compensation gaps of executives in promoting innovation performance; (3) analysts focus can weaken the internal and external compensation gaps of executives to promote innovation performance; (4) market competition can strengthen the internal and external compensation gaps of executives to promote innovation performance. Finally, based on the research conclusions, this paper puts forward relevant suggestions from the two levels of government and enterprises, in order to provide a certain reference for enterprises to improve their innovation performance from the perspectives of compensation system, internal control, analyst attention and market competition.