在并购浪潮中，尤其是在网络游戏上市公司的跨界并购中，由于存在严重的信息不对称，会导致估值不合理产生高溢价并购，进而引起上市公司进行大额商誉的确认与减值。而互联网游戏上市公司的商誉减值风险，通常给市场上传递一种负面信息，导致投资者、债权人等利益相关者对其未来盈利能力的预期不佳，投资信心减弱，从而引起股价的波动，甚至可能引发潜在股价崩盘风险，导致公司价值降低。因此，如何有效识别、分析、评价与防范商誉减值风险，已成为互联网游戏上市公司的管理者所面临的一个重大问题。

本文选取 ZL 公司为研究对象，在对国内外关于商誉减值风险的研究现状进行系统梳理，并回顾相关理论的基础上，首先介绍了 ZL 公司连续并购案例，然后从市场环境变化、估值、内部治理结构、盈余管理动机、融资与支付、整合经营六个方面识别与分析 ZL 公司连续并购商誉减值风险；其次基于商誉减值风险的概念、影响因素，构建包括 6 个一级指标、16 个二级指标的 ZL 公司连续并购商誉减值风险评价指标体系，运用层次分析法与模糊综合评价法对 ZL 公司连续并购商誉减值风险进行评价。结果表明：ZL 公司的连续并购商誉减值风险为高风险水平；各个一级指标的得分不同，存在明显的差异，整合经营风险最大，市场环境变化风险最小；同时，各个一级指标所包含的二级指标得分存在明显差异，市场环境变化风险所包含的 2 个二级指标中，政策风险的得分较高，经济环境风险得分较低；估值风险所包含的 2 个二级指标中，业绩承诺风险的得分较高，评估方法选择风险的得分较低；内部治理结构风险所包含的 2 个二级指标中，股权结构风险的得分最高，高管特征风险得分较低；融资与支付风险所包含的 4 个二级指标中，融资能力风险的得分最高，融资成本风险和融资结构风险的得分较低；整合经营风险所包含的 4 个二级指标中，业务整合风险的得分最高，战略整合风险和财务整合风险得分最低；盈余管理动机风险所包含的 2 个二级指标中，“财务清洗”动机风险的得分高于“平滑盈余”动机风险的得分。最后，提出如下对策与建议：一是合理估值，严谨设计业绩承诺；二是加强管理层监督，健全信息披露制度；三是健全公司治理结构，加强内部控制；四是加强融资管理，选择合理的支付方式；五是降低整合经营风险。

In the wave of mergers and acquisitions, especially in the cross-border mergers and acquisitions of Internet games listed companies, due to serious information asymmetry, it will lead to unreasonable valuation and high premium mergers and acquisitions, which will lead to the recognition and impairment of large amount of goodwill. However, the goodwill impairment risk of Internet games listed companies usually conveys negative information to the market, which leads to poor expectations of investors, creditors and other stakeholders on their future profitability and weakened investment confidence, resulting in fluctuations in stock prices, and even potential stock price collapse risk, resulting in the reduction of the company's value. Therefore, how to effectively identify, analyze, evaluate and prevent the risk of goodwill impairment has become a major problem faced by the managers of Internet games listed companies.

This paper selects ZL company as the research object, systematically combs the research status of goodwill impairment risk at home and abroad, and reviews the relevant theories. Firstly, it introduces the case of continuous M & A of ZL company, and then identifies and analyzes the goodwill impairment risk of continuous M & A of ZL company from six aspects: the change of market environment, valuation, internal governance structure, earnings management motivation, financing and payment, and integrated operation after M & A; Secondly, based on the concept and influencing factors of goodwill impairment risk, this paper constructs an evaluation index system of goodwill impairment risk of continuous mergers and acquisitions of ZL company, including 6 primary indicators and 16 secondary indicators, and uses analytic hierarchy process and fuzzy comprehensive evaluation method to evaluate the goodwill impairment risk of continuous mergers and acquisitions of ZL company. The results show that the goodwill impairment risk of continuous M & A of ZL company is a high risk level; The scores of each primary index are different, and there are obvious differences. The risk of integrated operation is the largest and the risk of market environment change is the smallest; At the same time, there are obvious differences in the scores of secondary indicators contained in each primary indicator. Among the two secondary indicators contained in the risk of market environment change, the score of policy risk is higher and the score of economic environment risk is lower; Among the two secondary indicators included in valuation risk, the score of performance commitment risk is higher and the score of evaluation method selection risk is lower; Among the two secondary indicators included in the risk of internal governance structure, the score of equity structure risk is the highest, and the score of executive characteristic risk is lower; Among the four secondary indicators of financing and payment risk, the score of financing ability risk is the highest, and the score of financing cost risk and financing structure risk is lower; Among the four secondary indicators included in integrated operational risk, business integration risk has the highest score, and strategic integration risk and financial integration risk have the lowest score; The risk score of "smooth motivation" in the "profit management" index is higher than that of "smooth motivation". Finally, the following countermeasures and suggestions are put forward: first, reasonable valuation and rigorous design of performance commitment; Second, strengthen management supervision and improve the information disclosure system; Third, improve the corporate governance structure and strengthen internal control; Fourth, strengthen financing management and choose reasonable payment methods; Fifth, improve the ability of resource integration and reduce the risk of integrated operation.

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