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论文中文题名:

 我国上市商业银行高管薪酬激励机制研究    

姓名:

 谢心欣    

学号:

 20080619    

保密级别:

 公开    

学科名称:

 企业管理    

学生类型:

 硕士    

学位年度:

 2011    

院系:

 管理学院    

专业:

 企业管理    

第一导师姓名:

 程书强    

论文外文题名:

 Study on the Executive Compensation Incentive Merchant of Listed Commercial Banks in China    

论文中文关键词:

 上市商业银行 ; 风险控制 ; 监管 ; 薪酬激励    

论文外文关键词:

 Listed Commercial banks Risk control Regulation Incentive compensation    

论文中文摘要:
全球金融危机使美国华尔街金融机构高管巨额奖金问题广为争议,也使当前银行业高管人员薪酬激励机制设计的合理性受到严重质疑,本文研究的主要内容是通过引入风险控制的薪酬机制设计,改善银行治理,使上市商业银行在追求利益的同时能够有效地控制风险,构建有效的银行高管薪酬激励机制。 文章根据银行性质、资产规模、经营灵活性等因素,把上市商业银行分成三类进行研究。经过文献分析,得出影响薪酬的传统因素:业绩和治理结构。其中银行高管薪酬与银行业绩的关系研究结果差异较大,而治理结构的完善有利于设计更合理的薪酬。另外上市商业银行更加注重整体风险,在薪酬激励中缺少对风险的控制。文章从银行治理机制的特殊性导致其激励机制的差异性分析,提出高管激励中应考虑监管和风险因素。在Holmstrom&Milgrom(1991)模型框架下,引入另一委托人监管方,论证使多个委托人最优状况的薪酬设计。然后利用上市商业银行年报披露的薪酬数据,采用实证研究方法探讨业绩指标、风险指标治理结构指标与我国上市银行高管薪酬的关系。 实证研究表明,目前大型商业银行和城市商业银行已基本建立与银行经营业绩相关联的薪酬激励制度,特别是城市商业银行高管薪酬与经营业绩相关关系显著。但尚未建立与风险控制相联系薪酬激励机制,高管薪酬与风险控制指标联系较弱。另外,银行规模指标与股份制商业银行和城市商业银行的高管薪酬相关,与大型商业银行不相关。结论提出在制定高管薪酬策略的时候,要充分考虑银行的性质、发展战略、资产规模和业绩以及高管来源等因素,提出高管薪酬激励机制中应综合考虑经营业绩和风险控制因素,加强上市商业银行薪酬信息披露制度以及加大对上市商业银行的监管力度等建议。
论文外文摘要:
There was a widely controversial about the huge bonuses of Wall Street executives in the background of The global financial crisis,people also questioned the rationality of the design of the banking executives compensation incentive currently.The purpose of this article is try to discover a reasonable mechanism design for the compensation incentive ,to improve the management of Bank and make commercial banks control risk at the same of pursuiting of the interests This article divided the listed banks into three categories Based on the factors of nature of banking, asset size, the flexibility of operating and other factors.The traditional factors affected the compensation were performance and governance structure.The results of the relationship between performan and compensation were quite different,and the perfect of governance structure can ensure compensation design reasonable . The banking industry pay more attention to the overall risk,but the compensation incentives lack of risk control,so this article first analyed the necessary of consideing the factor of risk control in compensation incentives from special nature of bank governance .Then demonstrate the necessary of consideing the factor of risk control in compensation incentives by altering Holmstrom & Milgrom (1991) model that added another principal,regulators.Then this article explore the relationship between executive compensation and the three factors based on the date of listed commercial banks . The empirical research indicated that the relationship between senior executives compensation and operating performance of large commercial banks and city commercial banks were significantly correlated,but the correlation is different.this two kinds of banks slao related with different risk control indicators ,but contacted small.In addition, the factors of size of asset related to executive compensation of the joint-stock banks and city commercial banks, the relation on the large commercial banks is not obvious.the size commercial banks related to executive compensation, this article proposed that when we make strategy about mechanism of senior executives compensation,we must fully consider some factors such as the nature of banks, the strategy of development , the size of asset and performance ,The senior executives compensation should consider operating performance and risk control ,to strengthen the information disclosure system of listed banks and increase supervision of banks.
中图分类号:

 F272.92    

开放日期:

 2011-12-15    

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