企业风险承担水平反映企业在经营过程中对风险的承受程度，高风险承担水平的企业偏好选择高风险的创新型投资项目，有助于企业抓住投资机遇，提升企业核心竞争力。高管作为企业的决策者，其风险承担的倾向对企业风险承担水平具有重要的影响，高管薪酬激励与股权激励的实施能够强化高管薪酬业绩敏感性，使高管拥有剩余价值索取权，会激励高管重视企业风险承担水平的提高。目前，我国制造业企业发展面临着“卡脖子”的困境，制造业企业想要突破瓶颈，实现创新，需要提升企业风险承担水平，此时给予制造业企业高管激励是否可以提高制造业企业风险承担水平，这是值得探讨的问题。

基于此，本文以制造业企业作为研究对象，探究高管激励对企业风险承担水平的影响。首先，本文对相关概念进行界定，并对国内外文献进行梳理，然后运用相关理论基础对高管激励、机构投资者与企业风险承担水平之间的关系进行探讨；其次，选用2010-2020年数据进行实证检验，研究高管激励对企业风险承担水平的影响机理，并检验机构投资者的调节效应，进一步对机构投资者的异质性进行分析；最后，本文将样本进行分组，研究不同产权性质下制造业企业高管激励机制对企业风险承担水平的影响。

研究结果表明：（1）高管薪酬激励与股权激励都能有效地提高制造业企业风险承担水平；（2）机构投资者持股作为调节变量，正向调节高管激励与制造业企业风险承担水平之间的关系；（3）压力抵制型机构投资者能够显著提升制造业企业风险承担水平，并且在高管激励与制造业企业风险承担水平关系之间具有更显著的正向调节效应，而压力敏感型机构投资者对制造业企业风险承担水平的作用效果并不显著；（4）不同产权性质的制造业企业高管激励的倾向程度并不相同。最后根据研究结论提出完善制造业企业内部激励机制，缓解高管风险规避倾向；促进机构投资者多元化协同发展，发挥机构投资者的治理效应；对国有制造业企业应重点实施股权激励计划，对非国有制造业企业应重视薪酬激励与股权激励的结合实施，从而提高制造业企业风险承担水平等对策建议。

The level of enterprise risk-taking reflects the degree of risk-taking in the business process.Enterprises with high level of risk-taking prefer to choose high-risk innovative investment projects,which helps enterprises seize investment opportunities and enhance their core competitiveness.As the decision-maker of the enterprise,the risk-taking tendency of senior executives has an important impact on the level of enterprise risk-taking.The implementation of executive compensation incentive and equity incentive can strengthen the sensitivity of executive compensation performance, make senior executives have the right to claim residual value,and encourage senior executives to pay attention to the improvement of enterprise risk-taking level.At present, the development of China's manufacturing enterprises is facing a "bottleneck" dilemma.If manufacturing enterprises want to break through the bottleneck and achieve innovation,they need to improve the level of enterprise risk-taking.At this time,whether giving incentives to senior executives of manufacturing enterprises can improve the level of enterprise risk-taking is a question worth discussing.

Based on this,this paper takes manufacturing enterprises as the research object to explore the impact of executive incentive on the level of enterprise risk-taking.Firstly,this paper defines the related concepts,sorts out the domestic and foreign literature,and then uses the relevant theoretical basis to discuss the relationship between executive incentive,institutional investors and enterprise risk-taking level;Secondly,the data from 2010 to 2020 are used for empirical test to study the impact mechanism of executive incentive on enterprise risk-taking level,and to test the regulatory effect of institutional investors,so as to further analyze the heterogeneity of institutional investors;Finally, this paper divides the samples into groups to study the impact of the executive incentive mechanism of manufacturing enterprises on the level of enterprise risk-taking under different property rights.

The results show that: (1)Both executive compensation incentive and equity incentive can effectively improve the risk-taking level of manufacturing enterprises;(2)Institutional investors' shareholding, as a regulating variable, positively regulates the relationship between executive incentive and risk-taking level of manufacturing enterprises;(3)Pressure resistant institutional investors can significantly improve the level of risk-taking of manufacturing enterprises, and have a more significant positive regulatory effect between executive incentive and the level of risk-taking of manufacturing enterprises, while pressure sensitive institutional investors have no significant effect on the level of risk-taking of manufacturing enterprises;(4) The incentive tendency of executives in manufacturing enterprises with different property rights is not the same. Finally,according to the research conclusion, it is proposed to improve the internal incentive mechanism of manufacturing enterprises and alleviate the risk aversion tendency of senior executives;Promote the diversified and coordinated development of institutional investors and give play to the governance effect of institutional investors;The state-owned manufacturing enterprises should focus on the implementation of equity incentive plan, and the non-state-owned manufacturing enterprises should pay attention to the combination of salary incentive and equity incentive, so as to improve the risk-taking level of manufacturing enterprises.

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