近年来，由于大股东独揽控制权及资本市场监管力度不强等诸多原因，导致大股东凭借其控制地位利用各种手段肆意侵占中小股东和上市公司的利益。其中上市公司大股东资金占用事件层出不穷，这不仅损害企业价值，而且扰乱了资本市场正常的秩序。因此，分析大股东资金占用行为及其应对措施，对于防范此类事件的发生具有重要意义。

    文章选取ST大集为样本公司，以委托代理理论、信息不对称理论、控制权私人收益理论及公司治理理论为基础，通过案例研究法对ST大集大股东资金占用进行剖析。首先通过ST大集披露的公开数据资料归纳整理，其资金占用的形式主要包括经营性资金占用中的商品销售、租赁等业务，非经营性资金占用中的资金拆借、投资理财和违规担保形式。其次通过Z值和F值衡量ST大集的财务风险，ST大集在发生资金占用事件之后风险程度加剧；通过分析ST大集2016年至2020年的财务指标趋势变化来体现其经营状况，数据显示ST大集在发生资金占用之后，企业资金短缺、偿债能力、营运能力、盈利能力受到不同程度的影响；通过事件研究法对股价的波动进行计算，结果表明中小股东在事件公告日后的利益遭受损失。从中分析出大股东资金占用的成因包括内部股权结构不合理、治理机制不完善、控制制度失效加之外部监管处罚力度不强等。然后从五个方面提出应对措施：（1）优化股权结构，引入机构投资者，提高中小股东参会率；（2）完善独立董事和监事的治理；（3）健全内部披露制度和财务制度的制定和执行；（4）加大监管机构处罚力度，设立官方学习平台，提高中小股民投资意识；（5）加强第三方媒体监督和外部审计监督。文章基于对ST大集资金占用案例的研究，旨在为抑制上市公司大股东资金占用现象，给上市公司和中小投资者维护自身权益提供参考性建议。

        In recent years, due to a number of reasons, such as major shareholders' sole control and weak supervision of capital market, major shareholders willfully occupy the interests of small and medium shareholders and listed companies by means of their controlling position. Among them, the capital occupation of major shareholders of listed companies emerges one after another, which not only damages enterprise value, but also disturbs the normal order of capital market. Therefore, it is of great significance to analyze the capital occupation behavior of major shareholders and its countermeasures to prevent the occurrence of such events.

         Based on principal-agent theory, information asymmetry theory, private income theory of control and corporate governance theory, this paper analyzes the capital occupation of major shareholders of STDaji Group by case study method. First of all, the public data disclosed by STDaji are summarized and sorted out, and the forms of capital occupation mainly include the sales and leasing of goods in the occupation of operational capital, and the forms of capital borrowing, investment and financing and illegal guarantee in the occupation of non-operational capital. Secondly, the financial risk of STDaji large set is measured by Z value and F value. The risk degree of STDaji large set is intensified after the occurrence of capital occupation event. By analyzing the trend change of financial indicators of STDaji From 2016 to 2020 to reflect its operating situation, the data shows that STDaji Great collection in the occurrence of capital occupation, enterprise capital shortage, debt paying ability, operating ability, profitability by different degrees of influence; The results show that the interests of minority shareholders suffer losses after the event announcement. The causes of capital occupation of major shareholders include unreasonable internal ownership structure, imperfect governance mechanism, ineffective control system and weak external supervision and punishment. Then, countermeasures are proposed from five aspects :(1) optimize the shareholding structure, introduce institutional investors, and improve the participation rate of minority shareholders; (2) Improve the governance of independent directors and supervisors; (3) Perfect the formulation and implementation of internal disclosure system and financial system; (4) Strengthen the punishment of the regulatory authorities, set up an official learning platform, improve the investment awareness of small and medium-sized shareholders; (5) Strengthening third-party media supervision and external audit supervision. Based on the case study of STDaji large-scale capital occupation, this paper aims to restrain the capital occupation phenomenon of major shareholders of listed companies and provide reference suggestions for listed companies and small investors to safeguard their own rights and interests.

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