加强对上市公司会计信息披露的监管，提高会计信息披露的质量，不仅可以保证证券市场长期稳定地发展，还可以减少信息获取的时间成本，同时也可以保护投资者的切身利益，增强投资者对市场的信心。业绩预告作为会计信息的重要组成部分，是投资者获取企业信息的重要来源，而业绩预告的虚假披露给市场参与各方带来了极为恶劣的影响。分析业绩预告虚假披露的原因和所带来的经济后果，可以更好地保护利益相关者的权益。

本文以尔康制药和海正药业为研究对象，运用案例分析等方法，研究业绩预告虚假披露的原因及经济后果，并从中得出结论，提出相关建议。首先，对相关领域的国内外研究现状进行了梳理，对业绩预告、虚假披露等概念进行了界定。其次对尔康制药与海正药业的基本情况进行了介绍，并把其业绩预告虚假披露的事件进行了梳理。运用舞弊三角理论，分别从不同的角度分析了尔康制药和海正药业业绩预告虚假披露的原因。最后，结合事件研究法和相关指标对尔康制药和海正药业业绩预告虚假披露的经济后果进行剖析。研究得到：（1）尔康制药和海正药业业绩预告虚假披露的原因主要是公司强烈的融资需求且自身盈利不佳、内部控制的混乱和不同的管理层利益驱动等。（2）尔康制药和海正药业业绩预告虚假披露会引起公司股价的大幅波动、商业信用降低、借款难度增加等严重后果。

根据研究成果，本文得出三点启示：第一，上市公司可以适当降低公司管理层的权力强度。第二，应当建立业绩预告的预审制度，若发生业绩预告修正，也应详细披露修正原因。第三，建立业绩预告质量分析框架，帮助投资者增强自己的风险意识，在投资时，能够对业绩预告的真实性和准确性进行判断，以避免盲目投资。

Strengthening the supervision of accounting information disclosure of listed companies and improving the quality of accounting information disclosure can not only ensure the long-term and stable development of the securities market, but also reduce the time cost of information access, as well as protect the vital interests of investors and enhance their confidence in the market. As an important part of accounting information, performance forecasts are an important source for investors to obtain corporate information, and false disclosure of performance forecasts has brought about extremely adverse effects to all parties involved in the market. Analysing the causes and economic consequences of false disclosure of earnings forecasts can better protect the interests of stakeholders.

This article examines the causes and economic consequences of false disclosure of earnings forecasts, using case studies and other methods, and draws conclusions and makes relevant recommendations. Firstly, the current status of domestic and international research in this area is reviewed, and the concepts of earnings forecasting and false disclosure are defined. Secondly, the basic information of Erkang Pharmaceutical and Haizheng Pharmaceutical is introduced, and the incidents of false disclosure of their earnings forecasts are sorted out. Using the fraud triangle theory, the reasons for the false disclosures in the forecasts are analysed from different perspectives. Finally, the economic consequences of the false disclosure of Elpida and Hazheng Pharmaceuticals' earnings forecasts are analysed by combining the event study method and relevant indicators. The study concludes that (1) the reasons for the false disclosure of Elpida and Hazheng Pharmaceuticals' earnings forecasts are mainly due to the companies' strong need for financing and their own poor profitability, disorganised internal controls and different management interests. (2) False disclosure of Elpida and Hazheng Pharmaceuticals' earnings forecasts can have serious consequences such as significant fluctuations in the companies' share prices, reduced commercial credit and increased difficulty in borrowing.

Based on the research results, this paper draws three insights: First, listed companies can appropriately reduce the power intensity of company management. Secondly, a pre-approval system for earnings forecasts should be established, and if revisions to earnings forecasts occur, the reasons for the revisions should also be disclosed in detail. Third, a framework for analysing the quality of earnings forecasts should be established to help investors enhance their own risk awareness and be able to judge the truthfulness and accuracy of earnings forecasts when investing in order to avoid blind investment.

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