作为碳排放量最大的发展中国家，中国面临着巨大的碳排放压力，随着“碳中和”“碳达峰”目标的提出，绿色低碳发展已经成为我国重要战略举措之一。煤炭运输企业碳排放量较高，其搬卸、运输等环节仍然采取传统模式，在碳减排方面存在较大的改进空间。但由于碳减排成本的存在，企业受利润最大化驱使在碳减排行为中可能存在投机行为，需要政府的进一步的监督和规范。基于此，本文运用演化博弈理论和数值仿真法，对双重治理下煤炭运输企业的碳减排演化博弈进行了系统研究。

（1）系统梳理煤炭运输企业碳减排过程中相关主体的行为关系和利益冲突，构建出中央政府和地方政府、地方政府和煤炭运输企业两两博弈模型，并对模型演化稳定性进行分析，得出不同条件下的演化稳定策略，研究发现：博弈主体的策略选择会受到另一方的初始意愿的影响，审查成本、碳减排成本、奖惩金额都会影响演化稳定策略的成立。（2）构建了中央政府、地方政府和煤炭运输企业三方博弈模型，并分别对博弈主体和均衡点进行演化稳定性分析，得到演化稳定策略和策略选择的影响变量，研究结果显示：当中央政府对企业无审查权时，中央政府和煤炭运输企业的策略选择主要受地方政府的影响，地方政府的策略选择则受中央政府或煤炭运输企业影响；当中央政府对企业有审查权时，博弈主体三者之间的策略选择相互影响；影响演化稳定策略成立的主要因素分别是审查成本、监管成本、碳减排成本、三种不同的奖惩金额。（3）结合三方博弈模型中的复制动态方程，运用MATLAB对变量进行情景仿真，对不同情景下博弈主体的演化路径进行研究，分析各个变量对主体策略选择的影响：审查成本、监管成本、碳减排成本与博弈主体的初始意愿均呈负相关；惩罚金额与监督者和被监督者的初始意愿均呈正相关；奖励金额则与监督者的初始意愿呈负相关，与被监督者的初始意愿呈正相关。（4）结合情景仿真结果，提出煤炭运输企业碳减排建议：加强对政府监督成本的控制，促使减排政策能够有效地实施；减小煤炭运输企业的碳减排成本，对企业碳减排技术和设备给予一定的引导和补贴；不断调整奖惩力度，更好地引导企业积极减排。

As a developing country with the largest carbon emissions, China is facing huge carbon emission pressure, and with the "carbon neutrality" and "carbon peaking" goals, green and low-carbon development has become one of China's important strategic measures. Coal transportation enterprises have relatively high carbon emissions, and their handling, unloading, transportation and other links still adopt the traditional mode, and there is more room for improvement in carbon emission reduction. However, due to the existence of carbon emission reduction costs, enterprises may speculate in carbon emission reduction behaviors driven by profit maximization, which requires further supervision and regulation by the government. Based on this, this paper uses evolutionary game theory and numerical simulation method to systematically study the evolutionary game of carbon emission reduction of coal transportation enterprises under dual governance, and the main research work and conclusions are as follows:

(1) Systematically sort out the behavioral relationships and conflicts of interest of relevant subjects in the process of carbon emission reduction of coal transportation enterprises, construct a two-pair game model of central government and local government, local government and coal transportation enterprise, and analyze the evolution stability of the model to obtain the evolutionary stability strategy under different conditions. (2) A tripartite game model of the central government, local government and coal transportation enterprise was constructed, and the evolutionary stability analysis of the game subject and equilibrium point was carried out respectively, and the influencing variables of evolutionary stability strategy and strategy choice were obtained, and the research results showed that when the central government did not have the right to review enterprises, the strategic choice of the central government and coal transportation enterprises was mainly influenced by the local government, and the strategic choice of the local government was influenced by the central government or coal transportation enterprises. When the central government has the right to review enterprises, the strategic choices between the three players affect each other; The main factors affecting the establishment of the evolutionary stability strategy are the cost of review, the cost of supervision, the cost of carbon emission reduction, and the amount of rewards and punishments. (3) Combined with the replication dynamic equation in the three-way game model, MATLAB is used to simulate the scenario of the variable The evolution path of the game subject under different scenarios was studied, and the influence of various variables on the strategy choice of the game was analyzed: the review cost, regulatory cost, carbon emission reduction cost and the initial willingness of the game subject were negatively correlated. The amount of punishment is positively correlated with the initial willingness of both the supervisor and the supervised; The amount of the reward is negatively correlated with the initial intention of the supervisor and positively correlated with the initial intention of the supervised person. (4) Combined with the scenario simulation results, put forward carbon emission reduction suggestions for coal transportation enterprises: strengthen the control of government supervision costs, and promote the effective implementation of emission reduction policies; Reduce the carbon emission reduction costs of coal transportation enterprises, and provide certain guidance and subsidies to enterprises' carbon emission reduction technologies and equipment; Continuously adjust the intensity of rewards and punishments to better guide enterprises to actively reduce emissions.